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As cyber vulnerabilities proliferate with the expansion of connected 
devices, wherein security is often forsaken for ease of use, Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) cannot escape the obvious, massive risk that 
they are assuming by incorporating emerging technologies into their 
toolkits. This is especially true in the maritime sector where SOF oper-
ates nearshore in littoral zones. As SOF—in support to the U.S. Navy—
increasingly operate in these contested maritime environments, they 
will gradually encounter more hostile actors looking to exploit digital 
vulnerabilities. As such, this monograph comes at a perfect time as the 
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was seized in the Strait of Hormuz by the Guard, in the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. 
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In 2021, the world took notice of the frailty of our interdependent supply chain networks. The Suez Canal, which is one of the busiest trade routes 
in the world, was closed for almost a week due to the massive container ship, 
Ever Given, becoming stuck after a sandstorm caused visibility to plummet. 
The dirty secret to this episode: the same effect could have been achieved 
via cyberspace by infiltrating the ship’s integrated technological systems. 
An ill-intentioned hacker could have achieved the same effect by slightly 
altering data in the ship’s navigation systems.
The vulnerability of maritime transportation systems, like that of the 
overall vulnerability of supply chain networks, has long been a source of 
concern within the cybersecurity community. As more devices are attached 
to the internet, and as more actors come online to exploit digital vulnerabili-
ties, discovering gaps in maritime digital security is becoming increasingly 
common. The recognition of these gaps in cybersecurity led to the Decem-
ber 2020 release of the National Maritime Cybersecurity Plan by the White 
House National Security Council. Although this plan will not instantly solve 
a long-standing problem, it does streamline federal cybersecurity standards 
for maritime transportation systems. Here, cyberspace risk hides in plain 
sight: the opacity of operational technology masks risk, thereby allowing 
malign actors to exploit networked systems.
As cyber vulnerabilities proliferate with the expansion of connected 
devices, wherein security is often forsaken for ease of use, Special Opera-
tions Forces (SOF) cannot escape the obvious and massive risk they are 
assuming by incorporating emerging technologies into their toolkits. This 
is especially true in the maritime sector where SOF operates nearshore in 
littoral zones (LZ). As SOF—in support of the U.S. Navy irregular warfare 
(IW) mission—increasingly operate in these contested maritime environ-
ments, they will gradually encounter more hostile actors looking to exploit 
digital vulnerabilities. As such, this monograph comes at a perfect time as 
the world becomes more interconnected but also more vulnerable.
The monograph’s authors, Gary Kessler and Diane Zorri, not only articu-
late the various vectors of digital compromise but also explicate how various 
maritime systems work and include real world examples of compromise. The 
viii
authors aim to reach a broad audience, not just those involved in the maritime 
domain. Hence, Kessler and Zorri start each chapter discussing what relationship 
SOF has to a particular digital tool. They then define what each digital tool is 
and provide case studies. The authors end each chapter with concluding observa-
tions that bring together and summarize the entire chapter. These concluding 
observations are particularly helpful and quick takeaways for the executive that 
cannot read the entire monograph. 
The authors of this fantastic volume provide the SOF reader with three key 
takeaways: competitive advantage, maritime IW, and technology vulnerabilities. 
Readers will agree that these takeaways ultimately provide both opportunities 
and risks for SOF, and that by confronting these takeaways early, SOF will be 
better positioned to compete globally in the future. 
Cybersecurity vulnerabilities will not go away. Therefore, it is up to SOF 
to reduce the magnitude of its own digital vulnerabilities while exploiting the 
vulnerabilities of its adversaries. Reading this monograph is a good place to start 
on understanding just how SOF can achieve that objective.
Mark G. Grzegorzewski, Ph.D.
Professor, Institute for SOF Strategic Studies
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Kessler/Zorri: Cross Domain IW Threats to SOF Maritime Missions
Introduction
A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are built for. 
 - John A. Shedd1
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has identi-fied several emerging threats to U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). 
These include, but are not limited to strategic sabotage, vulnerability to mis-
sile attacks, and innovative uses of technology by state and non-state com-
petitors.2 These threats highlight the importance for Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) to maintain the competitive advantage in support of U.S. Navy 
irregular warfare (IW), especially across globally contested domains, such 
as coastal and near-coastal environments.
If the threats above can be viewed as independent “vertical” vectors, the 
cybersecurity threat vector would be the “horizontal” that ties them together. 
Cyber and other electronic threats particularly in the maritime domain, have 
grown dramatically over the last decade. More and more actors are using 
cyber threats as a line of effort against U.S. naval forces and their compo-
nents. Malign actors understand that the maritime realm depends upon 
automation, and they seek to exploit vulnerabilities in shipboard systems. 
While there is appropriate concern being given to traditional great power 
adversaries—e.g., China, Russia, and Iran—tactical and strategic sabotage 
on information and information-dependent systems are becoming so com-
monplace and inexpensive that smaller nation-state adversaries and orga-
nized groups can take advantage of this deficiency by acting on their own 
or as proxies for great powers. Coupled with the relative ease with which 
information can be weaponized with fairly insecure maritime systems, and 
we see a formula for a new form of IW. This form of IW is exacerbated when 
we look at the littoral, or nearshore zone (LZ) of the world, since the biggest 
physical threats to ships are in the relatively shallow waters of the coast and 
inland waters.
Overview
This report will explore and identify maritime cyber threats that promote or 
enable IW vectors that can negatively impact naval activities within the scope 
2
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of USSOCOM. Moreover, this monograph integrates both the maritime and 
the cyber domains of warfare. While the intersection of the maritime envi-
ronment and the cyber realm is not explicitly defined, the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DOD) describes operations in cyberspace as follows:
Most aspects of joint operations rely in part on cyberspace, the 
global domain within the information environment consisting of the 
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures 
and resident data, including the internet, telecommunications net-
works, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. 
Developments in cyberspace provide the means for the U.S. military, 
its allies, and partner nations to gain and maintain a strategic, con-
tinuing advantage in the operational environment (OE).3
There are many ways in which sub-state actors, jihadists, and other ter-
rorist organizations are waging a guerrilla war on the sea via cyberspace.4 
Increasingly sophisticated and damaging cyberattacks are becoming more 
commonplace everywhere. Furthermore, attacks in cyberspace are now rela-
tively easy and inexpensive, including the jamming and spoofing of naviga-
tion messages to cause confusion or misdirection in and around ports.5 If 
an adversary cannot manage a cyberattack on its own, it can ally with like-
minded hacking groups—or, hire such a capability from those who adver-
tise “hacking as a service.” Hacking groups from China—such as APT10 
and TEMP.Periscope—have targeted the maritime industry, U.S. Defense 
Industrial Base (DIB), and U.S. military assets abroad.6 As noted in a 2019 
audit by the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, both commercial and govern-
ment maritime systems have become increasing susceptible to cyberattacks.7 
It has manifested as a global grey zone conflict, where proxies and cyber 
mercenaries use non-kinetic means to intimidate adversaries, steal precious 
defense technology, and compromise data and control systems. Thus, the 
most dangerous part of a sea voyage is often not in the deep ocean, but in 
the shallow waters of the LZ—including inland waters and ports—where 
malign actors can infiltrate a ship’s integrated technological systems. Causing 
a ship to veer from a precise course by even a few tens of meters can cause 
significant damage to vessels, ground assets, and/or delay vessel and cargo 
transport. Small errors in tight waterways ripple quickly and can rapidly lead 
to progressively more damaging second-, third-, and fourth-order effects.
3
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Characteristics of the LZ
The LZ refers to near coastal waters—the area of the ocean most affected by 
tides and currents, shallow waters, and vagaries of a coastline. This is the part 
of the ocean where local mariners would have the most intimate knowledge, 
a distinct advantage over transient sailors and guests. In hostile regions 
around the globe, the zone is often most traversed by seafarers without the 
means or reach of deep-sea watercraft. Water conditions change several times 
a day, as well as seasonally; small errors in navigation can cause disastrous 
results, being the difference between open water and running up on rocks.8 
This section will describe the characteristics of the LZ and considerations 
related to IW.9 For this discussion, we will use the DOD definition for littoral:
The littoral comprises two segments of operational environment: 
1. Seaward: the area from the open ocean to the shore, which must 
be controlled to support operations ashore. 2. Landward: the area 
inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly 
from the sea.10
The LZ, then, is the area where tides and currents are a significant factor 
on both water movement that affects ships and erosion that affects a chang-
ing seabed and shoreline. This is the area where the power and energy of 
the ocean is most acutely felt.11 While the water is often the focus of the 
LZ, much of the understanding of the near coastal sea is dependent upon 
understanding the shoreline and the interactions between the near coastal 
landscape and the water.12 See Appendix A for a more detailed description.
More significantly, the LZ has grown in its political, logistic, demo-
graphic, and economic importance over the past three decades. After the 
fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar world order, ten-
sions between states seeking regional hegemony—such as Iran and Saudi 
Arabia—have proliferated. The threat is most critical in strategic maritime 
chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz—where up to 21 million barrels of 
crude pass each day13—or the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which lies at the inter-
section of the Red Sea, Horn of Africa, and the Indian Ocean. Similarly, the 
vast majority of the world’s capital cities and population centers are in the 
littorals, underscoring their logistic and economic enormity.14
Because the LZ is where the sea and the land meet, straits and ports are in 
this zone and represent chokepoints for both merchant and military vessels. 
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Nearly 40 percent of the world’s population lives within 60 miles (100 kilome-
ters) of the coast, and almost three-quarters live within 200 miles (320 kilo-
meters) of the coast. It is also noteworthy that nearly 600 million people live 
in coastal areas at an elevation of less than 33 feet (10 meters) above sea level. 
Indeed, sea level rise presents a tactical issue as 
it impacts coastal erosion, storm surges, and 
tidal water encroachment into estuaries and 
near-coast river systems. Climate change has a 
disproportionate impact on the LZ compared 
with inland communities.15
Operating a vessel in the LZ requires a 
different skill set than operating on the open 
ocean. For instance, pilots are needed in com-
plex harbors and inlets because of the require-
ment of local knowledge for safe passage. Navigability of near-coastal waters 
depends on tides (and whether they are diurnal vs. semi-diurnal16), currents, 
and weather. Shoaling within a channel or river can quickly change the 
nature of the passage. Pilots need accurate charts to indicate the bottom 
composition, hazards to navigation, and other landmarks to aid positioning. 
Small, unanticipated changes in geographic position can be fatal to a vessel; 
accurate knowledge of location is important. Understanding the tidal effects 
on vessels, in terms of both water depth and current, are imperative. A small 
tidal change of just a few feet (1 meter) can cause ripping currents in some 
areas, while tidal bores of 5–30 feet (1.5–9 meters) occur in other regions; 
extreme tidal ranges of more than 50 feet (15 meters) are seen in the Bay of 
Fundy and Leaf Basin in Ungava Bay, Canada.17
The LZ is such a unique place in terms of military operations that the 
U.S. Navy designated a new class of surface warfare vessel in 2002 known as 
littoral combat ships (LCS). Because they are designed specifically to operate 
in the LZ, they take advantage of the fact that many traditional shipboard 
functions such as training, some maintenance, and logistics, can actually 
be performed on shore—thus reducing crew size and allowing for ships to 
be specifically designed to the nearshore task.18 These specialized craft can 
be more rapidly constructed at a lower cost than traditional Navy warships, 
meaning that more can be produced in order to focus on the asymmetric 
threats of IW in this zone.19
Nearly 40 percent of 
the world’s population 
lives within 60 miles 
(100 kilometers) of the 
coast, and almost three-
quarters live within 200 
miles (320 kilometers) 
of the coast.
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SOF in the LZ
Historically, SOF has been extremely active in the LZ. Operations inside 
the littorals include raids; ambushes; combat swimmer attacks; sabotage; 
abductions; reconnaissance; harbor penetration; visit, board, search and 
seizure; and extractions. Yet, as the U.S. military postures itself for an era 
of great power competition, some have questioned the utility of the LCS.20 
Meanwhile, the 21st century has seen the near coastal waters become the 
most active setting for discord in the maritime domain. Instead of major sea 
battles between large ships, the fight is in the domain of “irregular” adver-
saries, especially as smaller forces act as proxies for larger nation-states and 
near-peer competitors.21 Engagements with irregular forces and non-state 
combat at low intensities has shown an upward trend, thereby creating the 
need for SOF to become increasingly prepared to engage and preempt the 
tactics of adversaries in the LZ.22
Cybersecurity in the LZ
Although relatively well understood at a strategic level, little has been dis-
cussed about the cybersecurity impacts on warfare in the LZ.23 Like so many 
other aspects of applications of technology, cybersecurity implications are 
often an afterthought rather than considered during design and planning. 
Indeed, ship design and planning evolves at a much slower rate than changes 
in the cybersecurity threat landscape, making it difficult for ship infrastruc-
ture to keep up with cyber in the best of circumstances. Cybersecurity in 
the maritime domain has only become a focus area in the last decade and 
impacts many aspects of the operation of the entire Maritime Transporta-
tion System (MTS). The remainder of this document will specifically address 
several aspects of maritime cybersecurity as it impacts vessels in the LZ and 
cyberattacks that might be employed by irregular adversaries.24 Much of the 
discussion will cover implications for civilian vessels but might be equally 
applicable to—or could have an impact upon—military vessels. The nature 
of the LZ is such that civilian vessels will always be a factor because of their 
presence, relative ease of exploitation, and potential to become a threat to 
SOF operation. In addition, irregular adversaries might view civilian vessels 
as a target for hostile activity, cover for hostile activity, or as a weapon to use 
against traditional military forces.25
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Key Takeaways 
This monograph presents three key takeaways: 
1. Competitive Advantage. USSOCOM’s agility, global presence, and 
combat-focused mission requires forward thinking preparation and 
planning. As a combatant command that is joint by nature, USSOCOM 
is uniquely postured to maintain the competitive advantage in cross-
domain operations, such as maritime cyber.
2. Maritime IW. The maritime domain enables U.S. global reach and 
global power. While great power competitors and near-peer adver-
saries are growing their conventional forces, they are also pushing 
back against U.S. interests though proxies and gray-zone activities, 
especially in the maritime domain. SOF support of U.S. Navy IW is 
central towards limiting the maneuver capability of hostile forces.
3. Technology Vulnerabilities. While advances in the integration of 
maritime, satellite, and cyber technologies have greatly enabled the 
U.S. armed forces, nefarious activities such as hacking and spoofing 
are on the rise, enterprise-level maritime systems are vulnerable, and 
malign actors have been able to penetrate various points in the global 
supply chain. It is incumbent upon the SOF community to recognize 
these challenges, develop plans to test the resiliency of the force, and 
counter hostile actors when necessary. 
Organization of This Monograph
This monograph addresses how threats in cyberspace can negatively impact 
maritime U.S. SOF operations in littoral waters. The objective of this report 
is to identify relevant maritime cyber vulnerabilities that can be exploited 
and turned into viable threats against U.S. SOF. The relative risks of these 
vulnerabilities are also assessed and ranked to provide a strategy of how to 
mitigate, combat, or otherwise manage the dangers; thereby supporting the 
U.S. Navy’s intent of maintaining maritime superiority.
This section has provided an overview of the characteristics of the LZ 
and the relationship of that region to IW. Subsequent sections describe the 
most salient cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the maritime domain and their 
impact on warfare in the LZ. Chapter 1 reviews global navigation satellite 
7
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systems (GNSS) and the implications of electronic attacks on positioning, 
navigation, and timing (PNT). Chapter 2 examines the automatic identifi-
cation system (AIS) and vulnerabilities that can lead to numerous attacks 
affecting vessel situational awareness. Chapter 3 discusses how viruses, 
worms, and other malware can impact maritime systems, and how SOF 
can organize to be more resilient against vulnerabilities in the defense supply 
chain. Chapter 4 introduces how cyber vulnerabilities in industrial control 
systems (ICS) and Internet of Things (IoT) devices can lead to problems 
aboard ships and at ports. Chapter 5 discusses autonomous vessels and the 
ramifications of cyber vulnerabilities. The final chapter presents conclusions 
and the implications of maritime cyber issues for SOF, and the role of SOF 
in defense of U.S. Navy assets. The appendices provide technical background 
detail to the topics above so that the interested reader can further extrapolate 
their impact on IW.

9
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Chapter 1. Global Navigation Satellite 
Systems (GNSS)
A poor grasp of dead reckoning may have led Christopher Columbus 
to North America instead of India, a navigational error of about 
8,000 miles. - Eric Schlosser26
Humans have been navigating on the high seas for several thousand years. Early mariners used the weather, nature of the seas, position 
of stars, and presence or absence of certain bird and fish species to navigate 
from one place to another.27 The astrolabe, likely developed as early as the 
second century to determine latitude, was not routinely used until the 1400s 
by European explorers.28 The first circumnavigation of the globe using charts 
and instruments was reportedly accomplished by Magellan around 1520. 
Accurate marine chronometers with which to determine longitude were 
not available until the late 1700s.29 Maritime navigation aided by radio was 
developed in the early 1900s, followed by radar navigation in the mid-1900s, 
and satellite navigation in the late 1900s.30
GNSS refers to the myriad systems employing this latest generation of 
navigational aid. GNSS can also refer to the software applications that work 
with the Global Positioning System (GPS), such as target acquisition, missile 
guidance, search and rescue (SAR), coordinate bombing, precision survey, 
instrument approach, range instrumentation, close air support, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance. Although professional mariners rely on much more 
than just electronic aids for navigation and plotting, there is still consider-
able reliance on technical solutions and many still trust the electronics more 
than their own senses when the two are in conflict. This section will discuss 
some background of GNSS and GPS, and potential cybersecurity vulner-
abilities that can cause particular hazards in the LZ. Technical details about 
the operation of GNSS and GPS systems can be found in Appendix 2.
SOF and GNSS
Attacks on GNSS might generally be considered as falling more under the 
category of electronic warfare (EW) rather than cyberwarfare. The DOD 
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recognizes that many cyberspace operations include traditional computer- 
and network-based attacks on data, as well as significant portions of EW 
and other mission areas.31 Indeed, software-defined radio (SDR) for wireless 
networks and other emerging technologies are blurring the line between the 
common understanding of cyberattacks and EW, and these two missions 
are falling closer into alignment.32
Rather than employ the term secure GPS, DOD instead uses the term 
PNT, thereby both encapsulating the vulnerabilities of GNSS and the expec-
tations of the users.33 DOD has even defined the term navigation warfare 
to refer to defensive and offensive operations that affect PNT capabilities.34 
Meanwhile, GNSS applications are of particular relevance to the SOF com-
munity. GNSS technologies such as anti-jam GPS, anti-spoofing software, 
and EW systems allow SOF to operate in denied areas.35 USSOCOM reported 
that “2017 and 2018 saw unprecedented GNSS interference activity, from 
the eastern Mediterranean to Norway and 
Finland.”36 GNSS interference, and particu-
larly GPS spoofing, which causes the receiver 
to give false information, can mean the dif-
ference between life and death in military 
contexts. These technologies have become 
more affordable and widely available, put-
ting the SOF community in unprecedented 
danger.
GNSS Overview
GNSS is a generic term that refers to the four global satellite navigation 
systems: China’s BeiDou; Galileo, created by the European Union (EU); 
Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS);37 and the U.S. GPS—
plus the two regional systems: India’s Navigation with Indian Constellation 
(NAVIC)38 and Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System.39 Each of these systems 
are independent of one another, but work in a similar fashion. For purposes 
of this report, GPS will be the primary focus.40
Originally named NAVSTAR, GPS began as a joint project of the U.S. Air 
Force and U.S. Navy in the late 1960s and is generally considered to be the 
first GNSS. The GPS system and satellite constellation are currently managed 
by the U.S. Space Force.41 GPS transmits messages on three frequencies in 
GNSS interference, and 
particularly GPS spoofing, 
which causes the receiver 
to give false information, 
can mean the difference 
between life and death in 
military contexts. 
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the L band (1–2 GHz), denoted L1, L2, and L5.42 Each message contains such 
information as the current date and time, exact position of the transmitting 
satellite, and an approximate position of every satellite in the constellation. 
A GPS receiver can determine its exact geographic position by acquiring the 
signal from four satellites; the fourth satellite is essential for the recovery of 
the clock, which can reduce positioning error to just a few feet (1 meter).43
GPS satellites transmit their navigation messages in both encrypted and 
unencrypted form. The unencrypted messages are freely available to the 
public for civilian use and standard precision applications. The encrypted 
messages are intended for military and other official applications, making 
the signals more robust and resistant to spoofing than civilian GPS.44
GNSS Security Vulnerabilities and Mitigations
GNSS technologies have been under development since before the 1970s. 
With the exception of the use of encrypted codes for military applications, 
security was not one of the design criteria. Although GPS and other GNSS 
are undergoing constant upgrades and improvements in their technology, 
protocols, clocks, and extended satellite lifetimes—a process often referred 
to as GNSS Modernization—the systems remain vulnerable to several types 
of deliberate attacks that modernization does not address; of particular rel-
evance to maritime operations in the LZ are jamming, spoofing, and timing 
signal attacks.45
Jamming
GNSS jamming refers to any device or method intended to interfere with 
the GNSS satellite signals. Jammers work by distorting or otherwise over-
powering the signal so that the receiver cannot obtain its navigational fix. 
Since the GNSS signal reaches the surface at an extremely low power level, a 
small transmitter in the same frequency range can overpower the legitimate 
GNSS signals. Jammers are inexpensive and easy to purchase or build; a 
jammer for “personal use” the size of a hand-held radio can cause localized 
jamming within a 165 foot (50 meter) radius for a cost of about $15046 and a 
more sophisticated jammer to cause a more widespread outage is well within 
the financial reach of an adversarial force.47
Jamming can be very effectively used by one military force against 
another, because different GNSS constellations use different frequencies 
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(table 1). Thus, if two opposing forces are using different GNSS systems, one 
can safely jam the signals of the other without impacting their own signals.48
Another technology that allows easy access to advanced jamming is SDR. 
SDR uses a hardware transmitter that plugs into a computer’s Universal 
Serial Bus (USB) port, an external antenna, and freely available, open-source 
software in order to transmit any desired signal on any frequency the trans-
mitter/antenna are capable of, including those in the ultra high frequency 
(UHF) L-band. Use of SDR transmitters are within the technological reach 
of almost anyone, and there are even YouTube videos providing tutorials for 
building such devices.49
It is relatively straight-forward for GNSS receivers to detect efforts at 
jamming; analysis of the frequency power spectrum or measuring the signal-
to-noise ratio can indicate interference.50 Many GPS receivers, in fact, have 
built-in jamming—and spoofing—detection. Low-cost jamming detection 
can even be built using SDR, the same inexpensive “do it yourself” technol-
ogy that can be employed to build a low-cost jammer.51
While GNSS jamming is possible to detect and track—even from space52—
there are very few good defenses against deliberate jamming of GNSS signals. 
If a jamming signal is primarily interfering from a single direction, an anti-
jamming antenna can be used to alter the gain to essentially ignore the jam-
ming signal and rely on other legitimate signals. If several jammers can target 
a receiver from multiple directions, the only defense might be to employ 
a different GNSS constellation. The lesson here is that any allied military 
operation would be well served to use receivers that employ at least Galileo 
and GPS; utilization of multiple constellations provides both redundancy 
in case one system fails and the capability to ensure positional integrity by 
cross-checking between different systems.53
Table 1. L band frequencies used by GNSS with global coverage. Source: Lavrov, 
Russia’s GLONASS Satellite Constellation















Kessler/Zorri: Cross Domain IW Threats to SOF Maritime Missions
Spoofing
GNSS spoofing, as opposed to jamming, refers to actions that cause a receiver 
to lock on to a bogus signal and miscalculate its position. Unlike jamming, 
where a false signal merely needs to overwhelm a legitimate one, a spoofed 
transmission needs to have the same structure and timing as a legitimate 
GNSS navigation message, but changed in such a way that the receiver mis-
calculates its location.54 Because of the use of encrypted ranging codes, mili-
tary GNSS units are largely immune to spoofing unless the decryption keys 
are compromised;55 they are not immune, however, to jamming.
GNSS spoofing is always a deliberate act; it is complex and requires 
specialized equipment that can disrupt a legitimate signal in order that 
the victim computes a false position fix and/or a false clock offset.56 Most 
spoofing methods require that the bogus transmitter overwhelm the satel-
lite signals being received by a GNSS device and 
therein lies one of the ways in which spoofing 
can be detected. First, when the GNSS receiver 
locks on to the bogus signal, there is a distortion 
as it loses the legitimate signal, resulting in a blip 
that is visible on the GNSS display; there is no 
such distortion when there is a handoff between 
legitimate satellites (or if the spoofing device 
slowly increases its power so as to appear like a 
normal handoff). This anomaly can be seen in 
figure 1. In this example, after successful spoofing 
the GPS signal, attackers prompt the helmsman 
to steer the vessel off its original course (upper 
graph). The individual codes emitted by a half-dozen GPS satellites disappear 
at about the 400-second mark, as the spoofer captures the ship’s receivers 
(middle graph). Second, a spoofing detector based on monitoring the signal’s 
direction-of-arrival could warn the crew when it senses too little variance 
in the origins of the signals, as seen here at the 400-second mark (lower 
graph).57 Legitimate GNSS signals will come from at least four different sat-
ellites which are in four different directions (and distances) relative to the 
receiver whereas a spoofer can, presumably, only be in one place at one time 
so all signals will appear to come from the same direction and have the same 
relative power when received.58
GNSS spoofing is 
always a deliberate 
act; it is complex and 
requires specialized 
equipment that can 
disrupt a legitimate 
signal in order that 
the victim computes 
a false position fix 
and/or a false clock 
offset.
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Figure 1. Anomalies appear during a GPS spoofing attack. 
Source: Todd Humphreys/used with permission
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There are several detection methods or workarounds to GNSS spoof-
ing. Two methods are mentioned above: signal distortion detection, and 
direction-of-signal detection. A third method correlates the encrypted code 
on the L1 channel with the unencrypted code to ensure authenticity—even 
though a civilian GPS receiver cannot read the encrypted code information.59 
Another defense for civilian GNSS units, as with jamming, is to employ 
receivers that can employ multiple constellations; when spoofing is detected, 
the receiver can change to another constellation.60
One reason civilian receivers are more vulnerable to spoofing is only 
partially related to the use of encrypted codes; military devices are also hard-
ened because the encrypted code acts as a mechanism to authenticate the 
transmitter. If a civilian GPS unit receives properly formatted unencrypted 
signals, the device has no way to know if those signals are legitimate or 
spoofed. While many of these types of attacks are unlikely from “irregular” 
warriors, they are well within the capabilities of a nation-state that sponsors 
irregulars as proxies.
Other GNSS Vulnerabilities
A third major form of attack on GNSS systems is to disrupt the timing signal. 
GNSS-derived timing affects more than GNSS receivers. Many systems 
rely on GNSS to obtain their time; all digital telecommunications systems, 
including the North American mobile phone network and digital telecom-
munications carriers, must be synchronized to operate properly. Power grids 
and some Network Time Protocol servers on the internet also derive timing 
from GPS. Any system relying on GPS positioning—such as Enhanced 911 
(emergency) triangulation, or aviation and maritime transportation sys-
tems—requires precise timing.61 Timing disruptions do not need to be large 
to have big effects; a 1 nanosecond (10-9 second) error in timing can cause a 
1 foot (30 centimeter) positioning error.62 Again, this form of disruption is 
beyond the means of irregular warriors but not their nation-state sponsors.
A variety of mitigations have been suggested to deal with timing attacks, 
all essentially providing backup or augmentation to a device’s dependence 
upon GNSS for synchronization. One approach is to employ inertial naviga-
tion systems and inertial measurement units (IMU). IMUs use a combina-
tion of sensors, accelerometers, and gyroscopes to independently measure 
movement without use of an external reference, essentially employing a 
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highly advanced form of dead reckoning.63 Other approaches include pro-
posals to build alternate timing systems to provide an external reference for 
GPS.64 Finally, radio signals do not need to be manipulated to send bogus 
GNSS information if an adversary can gain physical access to a vessel. Such 
physical access to a military vessel is unlikely but manipulating civilian or 
autonomous vessels in the LZ can also serve an adversary’s purpose.
Messages can be sent between onboard devices requiring GNSS data via 
a variety of communications interfaces, such as the serial port (e.g., EIA-RS-
232), USB, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, SDR, and UHF radio.65 If bogus GNSS messages 
can be introduced into the system from one compromised device, the result 
can be false GNSS displays, operational errors, or, at the very least, confusion 
as to accurate position.66
GPS Disruption Case Studies and Implications
Jamming and spoofing of GNSS signals have grown so significantly since 
2010 that it has become a strategic weapon of conflict.67 It is certainly a 
major threat to commercial shipping and that can very well translate to 
a warzone which, by its nature, is intermixed with commercial and other 
civilian vessels.68
Instances of GNSS jamming have become commonplace in the news. 
Although illegal in the U.S. and many other countries, GNSS jammers are 
routinely used by many people under the guise of protecting their privacy. 
In one case, a man in New Jersey used a GPS jammer so that his employer 
would not know where he was during his breaks. His route took him near 
Newark Liberty Airport, and he inadvertently jammed the airport’s GPS 
system during trials of its automatic aircraft landing systems.69 While his 
intent was personal privacy, a nefarious user or an adversary could certainly 
use these same devices at any time. And, as mentioned above, jammers are 
relatively simple to build and easy to acquire.70 In many ways, jamming is 
the most significant problem facing GNSS since it has a low cost of entry, 
employs off-the-shelf technology, and can impact both civilian and military 
receivers.71
The first widely publicized civilian GPS spoofing demonstration of capa-
bility occurred in 2013. In this incident, a team from The University of Texas 
at Austin (UT) spoofed GPS signals in the Mediterranean Sea, causing White 
Rose Of Drachs, a 213 foot (65 meter) yacht, to alter its course and heading.72 
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So much has been written about this event that any malicious actor could use 
it as a blueprint for how to carry out such an attack. The team used commer-
cial, off-the-shelf products rather than sophisticated specialized equipment, 
making it particularly relevant to an irregular adversary.
The first step in the spoofing operation was for the UT team to determine 
which GPS satellites would be visible to the target at a given time. Using 
publicly available databases, the team fabricated the unencrypted codes on 
the L1 band for each visible satellite. At that point, the spoofing device started 
to broadcast very low-power signals carrying the legitimate codes of all the 
visible satellites. The spoofer slowly increased the power of the bogus signal 
until, eventually, the receiver latched onto the new signal and lost the legiti-
mate signals. By increasing the false signal strength slowly, the likelihood 
decreases of the receiver or the ship’s crew detecting a blip. Once the GPS 
receiver is listening to the bogus signals, the spoofing device can send a new 
set of position coordinates. In this case, the UT team sent signals that made 
it appear that the vessel had drifted three degrees to the left, a shift so slight 
that the crew assumed it was due to natural winds and currents. The crew 
then compensated for this by shifting the vessel slightly to the right which, 
in fact, took them off course. The test was terminated after White Rose Of 
Drachs was brought about 3,300 feet (1 kilometer) off course. While the crew 
had a priori knowledge that an attack would take place, they had no specific 
knowledge about how the test would be conducted nor did they knowingly 
cooperate with the attack team. Furthermore, a navigation system would 
have responded the same as the crew—albeit more quickly—so this same 
spoofing attack would have worked against a vessel using an autopilot.73
The UT demonstration of capability became an alarming reality in 2017 
when a mass GPS spoofing event occurred in the Black Sea. On 22 June 2017, 
the master of the 37,500 ton tanker Atria, off the Russian port of Novoros-
siysk, reported that his GPS showed Atria to be at Gelendzhik Airport—20 
nautical miles (37 kilometer) away (figure 2). Navigation systems from at 
least 20 nearby ships showed them all to be at the same location, so closest 
point of approach (CPA) alarms on many vessels were indicating imminent 
collisions.74
At the time of the Black Sea incident, there was widespread speculation 
that it was due to Russian EW. According to a 2019 report from the Center 
for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), the Black Sea event was, in fact, part 
of a larger pattern of Russian GNSS interference. By analyzing satellite data 
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Figure 2. A GPS display on board the Atria during a spoofing event shows reported 
versus actual position. Source: Captain Gurvan Le Meur/used with permission
gathered by the International Space Station (ISS), C4ADS concluded that 
Russia has been manipulating civilian GNSS signals since at least 2016. The 
ISS data show nearly 9,900 suspected spoofing incidents associated with the 
Russian military at ten global locations, including the Black Sea, Crimea, the 
Russian Federation, and Syria. The data also show more than 1,300 civilian 
vessels fed incorrect positional coordinates from a range of civilian satellite 
networks, including the 2017 incident reported by Atria.75
Since 2018, there have been many reports of GNSS issues in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, including signal interference, reduced position accuracy, 
and loss of signal.76 The affected areas ranged from Cyprus and the coast of 
Egypt to Israel and Saudi Arabia, resulting in multiple maritime advisories 
from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the U.S. Maritime Administra-
tion.77 GNSS outages continue to be a common occurrence all over the world 
impacting merchant shipping and other mariners.78 GPS spoofing incidents 
in Russian waters are also continuing, and have placed ships at multiple 
airports—including Sochi, St. Petersburg, and Vladivostok.79
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In July 2019, an escalation in the weaponization of GNSS spoofing report-
edly occurred in the Strait of Hormuz. Stena Impero, a United Kingdom 
(UK)-flagged oil tanker, was seized by Iran ostensibly for violating interna-
tional law. One claim was that it collided with a fishing boat, and another 
was that it was in the wrong channel when exiting the Strait. Regardless of 
the stated reason, reports had already come out that Iran was using GNSS 
spoofing, and a satellite track of the vessel shows it making a normal pass 
through the Strait before taking a sudden veer towards Iranian territorial 
waters (figure 3). Despite their claims of territorial violations, it is widely 
believed that Iran seized the vessel as retaliation for the British impound-
ing an Iranian-controlled oil tanker earlier in the month in Gibraltar for 
violating EU sanctions.80
A new escalation in GNSS spoofing was found after a reported incident 
in the Port of Shanghai in 2019. In mid-July, Manukai, a 700 foot (213 meter) 
container ship, was making way towards her assigned berth. While in the 
Huangpu River, the master of the vessel reported that the navigation system 
displayed another ship moving in the same channel. Then, the other ship 
Figure 3. The reported track is shown of Stena Impero just prior to its seizure by 
the Iranian Navy. Source: Lloyd’s List Intelligence/used with permission
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suddenly disappeared from the navigation screen. After a minute or two, the 
other ship reappeared, now at the dock. Later, the pattern repeated with the 
other ship appearing on the display moving in the channel, disappearing, 
and then reappearing back at the dock. Using binoculars, the master was 
able to locate the other vessel and confirm that it had never left the dock. As 
Manukai reached its own berth, its GPS receivers and all navigation systems 
suddenly failed, and the captain was unable to get a fix.81
This incident turned out to be just the tip of iceberg. Further analysis of 
AIS data by C4ADS showed that similar GPS spoofing had been occurring 
in the area since the summer of 2018—increasing in intensity and number 
of spoofing incidents over time, hitting a peak of nearly 300 spoofing events 
on the day that Manukai was affected. This event was a major escalation 
from the previously reported Russian spoofing where all targeted vessels 
showed up together at a single point; spoofed ships in Shanghai, China were 
found to jump around every few minutes to different locations that seemed 
Figure 4. GPS circle spoofing is shown in the area of the Huangpu River near 
the Port of Shanghai. Source: C4ADS/used with permission
21
Kessler/Zorri: Cross Domain IW Threats to SOF Maritime Missions
to concentrate in large circles, primarily on the east bank of the Huangpu 
(figure 4). Huangpu Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) vessels were 
among those targeted, where the data show almost daily spoofing attacks; 
one MSA boat was shown to have been spoofed 394 times in a nine month 
period.82 This so-called circle spoofing has also been reported in Iran and in 
other locations around the world, where vessels have found their equipment 
reporting their location thousands of miles from their actual position.83 By 
all appearances, GPS spoofing is a part of an escalating maritime electronic 
war in the area of Shanghai; more on this in the section about AIS spoofing 
below.
Concluding Observations
This section has described the operation of GNSS, with a particular focus on 
GPS. Like so many of our technology systems, they are surprisingly fragile 
and subject to malign intent. The importance of GPS to the nation’s critical 
infrastructures is so acute that an executive order (EO) was issued in early 
2020 to identify all ways in which GPS affects our nation’s infrastructures 
and add resiliency to the system.84 In addition, the USCG—responding to 
the request of more than a dozen maritime organizations—filed a formal 
protest with the United Nations over the threat to safe navigation posed by 
GNSS disruptions.85
For the SOF community, GNSS is essential for everyday operations. GNSS 
provides the warfighter with enhanced situational awareness, terrain aware-
ness, the projection of radio frequency countermeasures, and the ability to 
operate in denied environments. The GNSS-enabled warfighter is autono-
mous and—when it comes to understanding location, even in those hostile 
and foreign—largely self-sufficient. Without GNSS, the warfighter becomes 
more isolated; some communications become increasingly difficult. This 
kind of disruption can easily paralyze the warfighter on today’s technology-
enabled battlefield. Yet, while GNSS gives warriors a remarkable advantage, 
overreliance on the technology has become an exploitable liability in ways 
that are not even yet fully understood.86 To overcome this potential handicap, 
the U.S. Government has wisely “begun to place more emphasis on training 
warfighters in more traditional skills; reading paper maps, navigating by the 
stars with the help of sextants, and the use of physical map boards to monitor 
troop locations on the ground.”87 This is absolutely necessary to counter the 
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traditional assumption that these technological systems are always accu-
rate and operate without interference. Going forward, it will be important 
to train tomorrow’s warfighter to not only understand the technology, but 
to understand the assumptions behind the technological output. This will 
enable the warfighter to ask the right questions, challenge assumptions, and 
operate seamlessly in both an analog and a technological battlefield.
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Chapter 2. Automatic Identification 
System (AIS)
There are no rogue ships; there are only rogue shipowners. - Barista Uno88
The AIS is a situational awareness system whereby vessels and shore sta-tions within a 10–20 nautical mile range can exchange tracking infor-
mation. With this system, vessels at sea are aware of each other’s presence; 
maritime authorities in littoral states can identify and monitor vessels and 
cargo in their area of responsibility; and navigation, meteorological, safety, 
and other items of information can be exchanged between ships and shore 
stations—including ports. AIS is critically important in the LZ. These waters 
have the most congestion in terms of the number of vessels; the most hazards 
to navigation, given the relatively shallow waters of the near coastal zone; 
and the most danger from IW. A large number of adversaries could operate 
easily and freely in this part of the ocean.89 This section provides an overview 
of AIS, the cyber vulnerabilities of the system, and the implications of these 
vulnerabilities. Technical details about the operation of AIS can be found 
in Appendix 3.
SOF and AIS
Most of the technology required to maintain Maritime Domain Awareness is 
heavily dependent on AIS technology. For many years, U.S. Navy vessels have 
used AIS in receive-only mode as standard practice to preserve operational 
security.90 After a series of ship collisions in the Pacific Ocean, this policy 
came under review.91 Commercial vessels operating in international waters 
typically operate with an active AIS, but often conceal their movements to 
circumnavigate criminally active waters.92
AIS can serve as a warning to those conducting counter-piracy opera-
tions. Historically, hijackers of commercial vessels have been unfamiliar 
with the operation of a ship’s AIS. This can serve as a warning to those con-
ducting counter-piracy operations; if a commercial ship is not transmitting 
its AIS signals, or will not send their AIS beacon upon request, it is often 
a sign of piracy. However, a new trendline in the industry is revealing that 
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many tech-savvy pirates and proxies have become intimately familiar with 
shipboard AIS and are fully capable of spoofing the transmissions.93
While military vessels may have secure AIS, military ships are not 
immune to the hazards of AIS vulnerabilities. A malign actor can target a 
civilian vessel to force a harmful interaction with a military vessel, particu-
larly if the military vessel is invisible to both AIS—due to not transmitting 
AIS information—and radar, due to naval stealth technology. Likewise, a 
small irregular force can employ multiple AIS spoofing scenarios in order 
to masquerade as a larger force; direct commercial or military traffic into 
undefended or indefensible waters; or coax movement away from a safe port. 
In addition, a military vessel can alter its own signal to portray a slightly 
different location, with the intention of negatively impacting the defenses 
of adversaries.
AIS Security Vulnerabilities
Although AIS was designed in the 1990s, security was not built in to AIS 
standards until the current OneNet standard—which was released in 2020—
appears in products, projected for 2021.94 Balduzzi et al.,95 Goudossis and 
Katsikas,96 and Kessler et al.,97 among others, have discussed security vulner-
abilities in AIS that identify a variety of attacks on the system.
Balduzzi et al.98 have identified myriad attacks on AIS based on four 
primary protocol weaknesses:
1. Lack of validity checks. AIS messages contain no geographic valida-
tion information, meaning that it is possible for a bad actor to send 
an AIS message from one location while purporting to be in another 
location.
2. Lack of timing checks. AIS messages do not natively contain a time-
stamp, meaning that a bad actor can record valid AIS messages and 
replay them at a later time.
3. Lack of authentication. The AIS protocol provides no mechanism to 
authenticate the sender, thus anyone with the ability to transmit an 
AIS packet can impersonate any other AIS device.
4. Lack of integrity checks. AIS messages contain no message integrity 
checks, allowing an adversary to intercept and/or modify transmissions.
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Because AIS operates on public maritime radio frequencies, anyone with 
an AIS receiver can hear all the transmissions. While AIS transceivers were 
relatively expensive at one time, there are many ways today to build inex-
pensive systems—on the order of $100—to both receive and transmit AIS 
messages.99 AIS users also share the broadcast frequency. While efficient 
in terms of communications resources, this allows an attacker to usurp 
the bandwidth to deny other devices the opportunity to transmit, impede 
the shared time slot synchronization process, or change slot reservation/
assignment information. Any of these denial-of-service (DoS) attacks can 
effectively knock other AIS stations off the air or, indeed, render the entire 
system useless within a geographically localized area.
AIS Spoofing Case Studies and Implications
AIS employs publicly available message formats, transmits on public mari-
time radio frequencies, and is designed to assume that all transmissions are 
legitimate and valid. This allows a bad actor 
to transmit messages of their own creation, 
to spoof non-existent ghost vessels or aid to 
navigation (ATON), replay earlier AIS traf-
fic, trigger false SAR or CPA alerts, or send 
bogus weather or navigation information—
possibly causing a vessel to alter its course. 
Data about an existing vessel can even be 
altered in real time. An AIS DoS attack can 
cause a local AIS broadcast area to go dark. These attacks are enabled by 
software tools, commonly available on the internet, that can generate AIS 
messages.100
Figure 5 is a demonstration of the display of ghost vessels. The figure 
shows symbols for nine vessels in the Daytona Beach, Florida, area, dis-
played using OpenCPN101 chartplotter software. Details for each vessel can 
be found merely by clicking on the target. Chasity Brooke is a real vessel, as 
are six of the other targets shown here. Sea Fox and one other target are also 
real vessels but had been in the area six months earlier; their data are being 
replayed and interjected into the AIS data stream. A bogus vessel could also 
be injected into the system. It is impossible to tell from AIS alone which ships 
are real and which are ghosts.102
AIS employs publicly 
available message formats, 
transmits on public mari-
time radio frequencies, 
and is designed to assume 
that all transmissions are 
legitimate and valid. 
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Figure 6. An AIS display of real and fake virtual ATONs is shown in Ponce De 
Leon Inlet, south of Daytona Beach, Florida. Source: Gary C. Kessler
Figure 5. AIS display of real (Chasity Brooke) and ghost (Sea Fox) vessels off the 
coast of Daytona Beach, Florida. Source: Gary C. Kessler
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Figure 6 is a demonstration of ghost ATONs. The figure shows the physi-
cal red and green ATON buoys in Ponce de Leon Inlet on the east coast of 
Florida, marking the portion of the inlet that is dredged to a depth of at least 
30 feet (9 meters). The figure also shows a set of virtual ATONs that include 
a preferred channel marker, labelled “PI,” and virtual red/green ATONs 
defining a second channel on the south side, which is significantly shallower. 
These virtual ATONs appear on the display based upon spoofed AIS mes-
sages. The USCG has sole authority in the U.S. for transmitting information 
about virtual ATONs, but there is no mechanism with which to authenticate 
the sender of this information.103
Concluding Observations
AIS spoofing is any event where AIS-related displays show bogus informa-
tion. The earlier discussion of GPS spoofing related to Stena Impero off the 
coast of Iran and the Port of Shanghai were reported as AIS spoofing. The 
root cause in both cases, however, were spoofed GPS signals, which caused 
the AIS equipment to display incorrect information rather than spoofed 
AIS messages. That said, AIS spoofing is also a part of the larger Port of 
Shanghai story. Smugglers in the area, primarily carrying valuable cargos 
of banned sand and gravel, have been spoofing AIS signals—pretending 
to be other vessels—to escape detection by the authorities. The Shanghai 
MSA reports that illegal sand and gravel vessels accounted for 23 collisions, 
meaning two moving vessels striking each other—or allisions, meaning a 
vessel striking a stationary object—on the Yangtze River in 2018 at a cost of 
53 lives. The AIS spoofing threat shows no sign of stopping; in June 2019, an 
oil tanker suspected of smuggling oil had been sending cloned AIS signals 
and reportedly rammed an MSA patrol boat to evade capture.104 Reports in 
2020 described AIS data showing several boats traveling in circles around 
the area of Point Reyes, just north of San Francisco, California, although 
their true positions were confirmed to be in different locations thousands 
of miles away.105 Countering AIS jamming and spoofing will be a particular 
concern for SOF in the future. 
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Chapter 3. Malware And Maritime Systems
We worried for decades about WMDs—Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion. Now it is time to worry about a new kind of WMDs—Weapons 
of Mass Disruption. - John Mariotti106
Malicious software—also known as malware—is a threat to all com-puter systems and the information they contain. This chapter will 
discuss malware as it applies to the maritime sector. A tutorial providing 
details on the different types of malware affecting the maritime industry is 
provided in appendix 4.
SOF and Malware
The SOF maritime systems are far from immune to the effects of malware. 
Indeed, military cyber targets are of strategic importance in the theater of lit-
toral waters. Cyberattacks today happen at a time when the attacker chooses. 
Malware attacks are always deliberate, even when they do not target particu-
lar victims; advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks are always targeted. 
Malware can greatly interfere with SOF freedom of maneuver and military 
communications systems. Yet, with the constant barrage of cyber events, a 
deliberate attack might be missed in the “fog of war” or the intent of an event 
misinterpreted, which could cause unanticipated responses.
The ultimate target of a malware-based cyberattack might not be the ini-
tial victims—in fact, a common strategy for information operators is to find 
the weakest link in a supply chain and use that victim as the starting point 
for an attack targeting a partner. Such attacks might result in supplies not 
being where they are needed, parts being replaced by counterfeit or otherwise 
inadequate substitutes, or leakage of mission plans. The use of malware is 
growing, especially in terms of the sophistication of the applications. From 
the SOF context, irregular and malicious adversaries are routinely aided by 
nation-states for whom they are merely proxies. The trendline is growing, 
and these irregular forces have the capability to conduct “morally ambiguous 
operations while maintaining plausible deniability.”107
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Malware and Maritime Systems Case Studies
An example of the impact of a cyberattack on a maritime operation is that 
of the EternalBlue exploit tool NotPetya worm and the Danish shipping 
company, A.P. Møller-Maersk. The story starts in April 2017 when the hack-
ing group, The Shadow Brokers, provided a large number of cyber exploit 
tools allegedly created by the National Security Agency (NSA) and Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to WikiLeaks.108 One of those tools was called 
EternalBlue, an exploit for a vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows oper-
ating system’s Server Message Block (SMB) service.109 Although Microsoft 
had released a patch during the previous month, it had not been universally 
applied by the user community.110 Furthermore, no patch had been released 
for discontinued versions of the operating system, including Windows XP, 
which had an end-of-life in April 2014.111
The first EternalBlue-based cyberattack started on 12 May 2017, when 
the WannaCry ransomware worm started circulating around the world. In 
the first 24 hours, WannaCry infected tens of thousands of computers in 
99 countries throughout the Americas, Asia, and Europe; by the end of the 
second day, more than 200,000 computers in 150 countries were infected. 
WannaCry is not known to have specifically targeted any of its victims. 
It was a worm that traveled around the internet infecting susceptible sys-
tems, which included approximately 80 percent of the computers in the UK’s 
National Health System that were still using Windows XP.112 WannaCry died 
down a few days later after Microsoft released an emergency patch for older 
operating systems, and a cybersecurity researcher found a “kill switch” that 
halted further propagation.113
This was not the end of EternalBlue, however. On 27 June 2017, malicious 
actors released a new worm called NotPetya, which also employed the Eter-
nalBlue exploit. Even though Microsoft’s patch in response to WannaCry 
would have also prevented damage from NotPetya, there were still hundreds 
of thousands of unpatched systems around the world. Unlike WannaCry, 
which was possibly intended to be a money maker for the attackers, NotPetya 
appears to have been designed to cause destruction of files and computer sys-
tems. Although sites in the Ukraine were the primary targets, any unpatched 
Windows system could be victimized.
One such victim of NotPetya was Maersk, whose information technol-
ogy (IT) systems were shutdown network-wide, including their terminal in 
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the Port of Los Angeles. All of Maersk’s network domain controllers were 
compromised, except one in Ghana that just happened to be offline at the 
time of the attack due to a power failure. Using that one server, Maersk was 
able to rebuild its IT communications after replacing their entire network 
infrastructure of more than 45,000 computers and 4,000 servers. Maersk’s 
network was down for 10 days and experienced a revenue loss estimated 
around $300 million.114
From the maritime perspective, this example is not just about Maersk’s 
network being down and/or disrupted for nearly two weeks, but the ripple 
effect. The company is responsible for 76 ports around the world and operates 
800 vessels that carry tens of millions of tons of cargo every year. Maersk’s 
computer systems manage a complex operational network where a ship enters 
a port every 15 minutes somewhere around the world, representing nearly 
20 percent of the world’s cargo shipping capacity.115
Ransomware and other forms of malware targeting the maritime industry 
were particularly prevalent by 2018. In July 2018, for example, there was a 
ransomware attack affecting the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), 
the third largest shipping company in the world with more than 1,100 ships 
and more than 1.5 million cargo containers. 
The attack focused on Windows systems and 
impacted the company’s internal network and 
e-mail systems, forcing the shutdown of its ter-
minal at the Port of Long Beach. Within a day, 
there was widespread network failure across 
COSCO Americas, affecting e-mail, local web-
sites, and telephone systems in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Panama, 
Peru, the U.S., and Uruguay. As a precautionary measure, COSCO suspended 
bookings of hazardous and awkward cargo. Although vessels themselves 
were reportedly not affected, port operations in the Western Hemisphere 
were disrupted for days.116
In September 2019, the ports of Barcelona and San Diego reported ran-
somware infections within five days of each other. Both incidents were caused 
by ransomware called Ryuk.117 Ryuk has continued to make the rounds of 
maritime ports, resulting in a USCG Marine Safety Information Bulletin 
after the ransomware was found at another U.S. port. In all cases, port opera-
tions were disrupted although ships were presumably unaffected.118 The Aus-
tralian shipping company, Toll, was hit by two ransomware infections in the 
Ransomware and 
other forms of malware 
targeting the maritime 
industry were particu-
larly prevalent by 2018.
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first half of 2020, affecting many of their regional operations; they have a 
presence at more than 1,200 locations in 50 countries.119 The infection vector 
in these cases appears to have been phishing e-mails, clearly indicating that 
these were targeted attacks. Like many sectors in cyberspace, the maritime 
industry was literally hammered with ransomware attacks in 2020, with 
more than a half dozen highly publicized incidents.
In another example, a 2018 malware incident caused the malfunction 
of a ship’s electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS). The 
ship was designed for paperless navigation and did not carry paper charts, 
so the departure of the ship from its port was delayed by several days. The 
crew mistook the failure of the ECDIS as a technical failure, and it was 
not until a technician arrived from the ECDIS manufacturer that they dis-
covered that both ECDIS networks were infected with a virus. In a second 
example, a ship’s main application server was infected with ransomware that 
encrypted critical files, which caused complete disruption of the vessel’s IT 
infrastructure and rendered the applications needed for ship operations to 
be unusable. The incident kept reoccurring even after complete restoration 
of the server. The root cause of the infection was found to be poor password 
policies that allowed the attackers to successfully brute force remote man-
agement services.120
Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Today’s supply chain—both military and civilian—has myriad vulnerabili-
ties due to an incredibly complex, globally interconnected ecosystem that 
has multiple layers of outsourcing. While using commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) products have lowered costs, decreased delivery times, improved 
the ability to build innovative solutions, and improved device and system 
interoperability, it has also added the risk that the buyer ultimately may not 
know the true source of every component in a system. Risks to the supply 
chain include the use of counterfeit components, use of unauthorized hard-
ware manufacturers and software developers, theft, alteration, and poor 
manufacturing or development processes.121
The supply chain is a target of malicious access because suppliers often 
have bona fide credentials allowing them to directly connect to systems 
behind firewalls and other cyber protections. If a malign actor wants to 
access a particular target organization and cannot get through the target’s 
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cyber defenses, a common approach is to compromise a supply chain part-
ner’s network—which often is not as well defended—and use their access to 
penetrate the intended victim’s system. This can be particularly insidious if 
the supply chain partner is purposely working with a foreign government.122
Another way to gain access, particularly in today’s global manufactur-
ing economy, is the installation of mali-
cious software or firmware in hardware 
shipped by a nefarious or compromised 
vendor. The U.S. military’s dependence 
on the vast DIB has created avenues for 
proxies to interfere with the integrity of 
the supply chain. In one example, a 2014 
report revealed that a Chinese manu-
facturer had installed the Zombie Zero 
malware in Windows XP-embedded scanners. One victim was a company 
that tracked packages being onloaded and offloaded from ships, as well as 
trucks and planes. The data—which included origin, destination, contents, 
and system data—was then transmitted to the company’s central database. 
Although the company had excellent perimeter security, the scanners were 
behind the firewall and part of the internal network. The malware was able 
to compromise the central server—providing the malign actor a foothold 
within the shipper’s network and a pathway to exfiltrate any databases.123 
While this manufacturer has reportedly been removed from U.S. military 
and government approved vendor lists, the potential issue remains with any 
untrusted manufacturer and/or port authority.124
Chinese manufacturers also have a history of building keystroke loggers 
into hardware and software keyboard products they produce.125 Yet, prod-
ucts from Chinese manufacturers are not the only susceptibility. In some 
cases, Chinese products are re-packaged and fraudulently labeled as “Made 
in the U.S.A.” by American companies, which adds to the complexity and 
serpentine character of the supply chain issues.126
Concluding Observations
Maritime cyber events are not isolated incidents; on the contrary, they are on 
the rise. Shipboard, port, and other maritime networks are as susceptible to 
viruses and other malware as any other computer network. By 2018, several 
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reports highlighted the growth in cybersecurity issues aboard ships and in 
ports, where researchers have found numerous incidents of ransomware, 
USB malware, and worms.
The implications of the growing trendline in this area are profound for 
SOF, as all maritime systems need to be protected against malware and 
other cyberattacks, and no network stands in isolation. The SOF community 
operates at the tactical end of the conflict spectrum, yet every agency and 
organization has some communication with suppliers and partners. Mari-
time and military networks need to address near-continuous threats to the 
global supply chain. There is an increasing number of threats to maritime 
and DOD operations where cyber is an instrument, vector, and/or target 
of the activity. Meanwhile, the supply chain encompasses management of 
personnel and materiel, as well as communication with ports, allies, civilian 
vessels, and suppliers.127
Looking to the future, the SOF community will be challenged with ensur-
ing the safety of its personnel, while simultaneously creating a meticulous 
and rigorous method for protecting military networks, and the materials and 
goods from the global supply chain. Across the government, several agencies 
have identified best practices in managing the risk from foreign entities and 
malign actors, many of which can be adapted for the SOF enterprise. These 
best practices include, but are not limited to: 
• developing rigid guidelines for acquisition professionals, and ensuring 
contractors adhere to industry standards; 
• identifying Supply Chain Risk Managers to act as stakeholders for 
standards;
• ensuring contract language includes an audit capability for the supply 
chain;
• educating and training professionals in the organization about the 
risks inherent in the supply chain; and 
• encouraging continual assessments, exercises, and auditing of the 
entire process.
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Chapter 4. Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
It’s expected that the cyber-physical systems revolution will be more 
transformative than the IT revolution of the past four decades.  
- Hausi A. Müller128
CPS is a broad term, referring to the integration of the cyber and physi-cal worlds by combining computers, machinery, and people to form 
operational systems. CPS is a disruptive technology, combining computa-
tion, communications, and control as an enabler for smart infrastructures 
and industrial applications in all aspects of human life and across all critical 
infrastructure sectors. Nowhere is this truer than in transportation and, par-
ticularly, in the maritime transportation sector. This chapter will introduce 
CPS and related terminology, its impact on the MTS—particularly important 
in the LZ—and some of the cybersecurity aspects affecting maritime use of 
CPS technologies.129 CPS technologies are described in detail in appendix 5.
The pinnacle of CPS is the IoT, the concept of combining various enabling 
technologies in new ways to provide new services. IoT combines data ana-
lytics, advanced sensors, and new software to allow individual devices to 
share information and participate in system-level decisions, transforming 
conventional physical devices into smart ones. The enabling technologies 
and functions used in IoT systems are not new. What is new is the ways in 
which they are connected and work together, the ability to enable innova-
tion, and the seemingly endless machine-to-machine and people-to-machine 
applications.130
The significance of IoT cannot be overestimated. Consider that there 
were 15.4 billion IoT devices worldwide in 2015. That number doubled to 
30.7 billion by 2020, and it is estimated to more than double again to 75.4 
billion by 2025—which represents more than nine IoT devices per person.131 
Applications are found throughout critical infrastructures and other aspects 
of human endeavor—including smart cities, connected healthcare, smart 
agriculture, connected industry smart supply chains, smart power, and smart 
retail. The transportation sector has many IoT applications, including the 
connected car, smart airports, and, of course, smart ships and ports.132
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SOF and CPS
Within the United States, the USCG has responsibility for the maritime 
transportation system, including ports, vessels within U.S. waters, inland 
waterways, and U.S. near coastal waters.133 As the U.S. military defines a 
strategy to protect MTS CPS technologies, malign actors are actively seek-
ing to stockpile zero-day exploits—vul-
nerabilities that have not been patched or 
made public—as offensive cyberweapons. 
From the SOF perspective, the security 
risks posed by the proliferation of net-
worked devices leaves tacticians exceed-
ingly vulnerable. It is difficult for the 
military to perform operations without 
being detected, and even harder to conceal 
day-to-day operations. The sheer prolifera-
tion of networked devices—much of those 
including COTS equipment—provides malign actors penetration points for 
data mining, surveillance, and other nefarious activity.
CPS Applications and Cyber Implications in the Maritime Sector
Modern merchant and military vessels are increasingly complex and have 
been introducing new forms of automation for decades. Shipboard automa-
tion has, by and large, augmented human operators and engineers, and made 
operations safer and more efficient.134 Individual automated systems on ships 
have evolved into an integrated ship model where systems are increasingly 
intertwined.
Many shipboard functions are controlled automatically so that systems 
can maintain their states according to preset parameters—such as the tem-
perature of cooling water, fuel viscosity into the engine, speed and course 
over ground, or ballast tank levels. This automation allows a vessel to get by 
with fewer crew members, and also provides some functions that would be 
almost impossible to carry out manually with the same level of precision. 
As an example, a ship’s dynamic positioning system can maintain a nearly 
exact position by using a set of thrusters to accommodate for surge, sway, 
yaw, wind, current, waves, and other forces; manual control of such a system 
would be practically impossible.135
As the U.S. military defines 
a strategy to protect MTS 
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Shipboard automation has, historically, improved the ability to manage, 
monitor, and control existing shipboard subsystems, such as:136
• hull, mechanical, and electrical systems
• warfare systems
• shipboard electricity
• propulsion and maneuvering systems
• auxiliary machinery






New and innovative systems are made possible by emerging CPS and 
IoT technologies. Some examples of new ways to use computers and com-
munications in maritime include:
Digital rope. Using embedded sensors, mooring lines can monitor ten-
sion, time, and temperature, and can provide early detection of wear 
and failure; the lines can communicate back to an app on the bridge.137
Equipment maintenance. Traditional Interactive Electronic Technical 
Manual maintenance systems can be augmented with CPS technology to 
automatically and proactively collect and analyze data; rapidly improving 
the speed and accuracy in detecting and repairing faulty equipment.138
Intelligent container terminals. Approximately 90 percent of the world's 
cargo is transported by ship, and these cargo vessels themselves are getting 
larger and larger. Maritime container traffic has become a fast-growing 
segment in the shipping industry, and ports have become the bottleneck 
in the movement of cargo. Optimization of the process requires commu-
nication between all elements in the near coastal supply chain— namely, 
the vessels, ports, maritime terminal, and cargo handling systems. CPS/
IoT technologies have been key to the creation of a cooperative cognitive 
maritime cyber-physical system to provide high-speed, low-cost com-
munication between ships, ports, buoys, oil/gas platforms, and shore 
stations, including the full or partial automation of cranes and transport 
vehicles at the ports.139
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As suggested by this short list, IoT concepts can be applied to any mari-
time system, limited only by our imagination and creativity. The concept 
of shipboard IoT, or Internet of Ships, merely recognizes that current and 
emerging information and communications technology (ICT) systems, 
appropriately provisioned and configured, can allow system designers to 
better leverage existing mechanical and technical assets, enable innova-
tion, build scalable systems, improve efficiency and agility, and make a big 
impact on operations with small changes. New ways of using sensors and 
CPS enable many types of integrated shipboard systems, from the bridge to 
the engine room.140 As a master knows more about the state of the ship, this 
information can also optimize supply chain operations, ensuring that fuel 
and other supplies are precisely where they need to be precisely when they 
need to be there.141
Maritime CPS equipment has the same potential security vulnerabili-
ties and weaknesses as other computers. As an example, the Auto-Maskin 
DCU 210E engine supervision unit, RP 210E remote touchscreen panel, and 
Marine Pro Observer app are a set of hardware devices and smartphone 
apps used to monitor and control ship engines.142 In 2018, they were found 
to have several authentication and encryption vulnerabilities—including 
the use of an undocumented remote access 
server using hard-coded username and 
password; an undocumented protocol with 
which to communicate with other devices 
without any validation procedure; cleart-
ext transmission of sensitive information; 
and an embedded web server that transmits 
the administrator personal identification number in plain text. These flaws 
could allow an attacker to access and control any connected engines, deter-
mine what sensors are present and in use on the ship’s network, determine 
system configurations and settings, and send arbitrary control messages to 
the engine control units.143
IoT camera systems have also been targeted by bad actors. In 2017, a 
Louisiana-based maritime company reported that cameras on a quarter of its 
small fleet of boats had been compromised. In this case, Dahua DHI-HCVR 
systems were accessed remotely via the Web by exploiting a weakness in the 
camera’s authentication procedures; the camera’s contrast settings were set 
to darken the resolution, effectively blinding the camera.144 Other reports 
Maritime CPS equipment 
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emerged that this same camera had previous issues where remote users could 
circumvent authentication and 13 other vulnerabilities that dated back as far 
as 2013.145 In 2018, camera images from Moroccan-flagged fishing vessel Mist 
were posted to Twitter and claimed to have been taken remotely over the 
internet. The reports could not be confirmed because of missing metadata,146 
but the images appeared legitimate and certainly plausible.147
Communications systems are particularly vulnerable targets because, 
by definition, they have a connection to outside, public networks. With IoT 
devices, however, the problem is exacerbated by internet tools that aid in 
finding vulnerable communications systems (figure 7). One of the first widely 
reported attacks on a communication antenna targeted the Cobham Sailor 
900 very small aperture terminal system,148 which had a buffer overflow vul-
nerability allowing an attacker to bypass login authentication and execute 
remote code.149 This problem is not unique to one product or one manu-
facturer, and many reports subsequently emerged about vulnerable com-
munications terminals, buffer overflows, and weak password management 
(e.g., a null username or a username of bridge with a password of 12345).150
Accessing a communications terminal via IoT databases has also been 
reported as a vector to do significantly more damage, including turning the 
Figure 7. Shodan is used to find vulnerable IoT systems. Source: Shodan/used 
with permission
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devices against people. Presentations at Black Hat 2014 and Black Hat 2018 
demonstrated vulnerabilities in satellite communications (SATCOM) termi-
nals that included software backdoors, insecure communications protocols, 
and buffer overflows. If exploited, these vulnerabilities could:151
• disrupt, intercept, or modify onboard SATCOM
• attack crew’s devices
• control SATCOM antenna positioning and transmissions
• perform high intensity radiated field cyber-physical attacks
• reverse engineer product backdoors in order to gain access
As noted earlier, automated ship systems have been in use for many 
decades. The vulnerability of software-controlled systems became evident in 
the early days of automated ballast systems. Ms Zenobia was on her maiden 
voyage from Sweden in June 1980. During the first leg of the trip, Zenobia 
started listing to port due to excess water in the ballast tanks; after being 
righted, she continued on her journey. At Larnaca, Cyprus, her list reoc-
curred due to a software error in the computerized pumping system and 
she was towed out of the harbor as a precautionary measure. The automatic 
system continued to pump water, and when Zenobia reached a 45 degree list 
to the port, the Larnaca port captain refused her re-entry. Zenobia capsized 
in 138 feet (42 meters) of water, with no loss of life.152 Although not a cyber-
attack—in that there was no external manipulation of the software—this 
is an object lesson that automated software systems are a vector for harm. 
Software can be manipulated through the use of malware or bogus updates, 
and manual overrides can save ships, cargo, and lives.
Two additional examples help to illustrate the fragility of vessel stabil-
ity and how software vulnerabilities can be a potential vector for harm to 
ships. In 2015, high-end car carrier Hoegh Osaka ran aground after leaving 
Southampton and was stranded in The Solent—the strait separating the Isle 
of Wight from the English mainland—for 19 days. Due to the vessel being 
unstable before leaving port, Hoegh Osaka developed a 40 degree starboard 
list, leaving the rudder and propeller out of the water. Shifting cargo resulted 
in a hull breach, allowing seawater to enter. In this case, the ship was near 
a deep-water channel and sinking would have blocked container ships, pas-
senger ships, and ferries. The investigator’s report indicated that there was a 
significant difference between the actual and estimated cargo weight, result-
ing in unsafe stability calculations.153 In 2019, vehicle carrier Golden Ray with 
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a cargo of 4,200 vehicles was grounded in St. Simons Sound, Georgia, United 
States. The vessel started to list approximately 23 minutes after it left port; 
the pilot on board deliberately grounded the ship so that she would be out 
of the channel. She later rolled over on her port side. Even though Golden 
Ray was grounded out of the channel, the Port of Brunswick was closed for 
four days; if it had capsized in the channel, the effect on the port would have 
been far longer lasting.154 The instability of these ships was most likely due 
to human error, but the load management software certainly demonstrates 
a lucrative target for cyber attackers.
CPS and IoT transformation of the MTS is not limited to just ships. 
Today’s ports comprise a complex infrastructure of ICT, machinery, busi-
ness processes and transactions between trading and supply chain partners, 
regulations, and stakeholders. This includes port owners, port authorities, 
port operators, unions, shipping and other transportation companies, and, 
in some cases, the military.155 Digitalization in the form of combining IoT, 
CPS, big data, and machine learning (ML) provides an incredible opportu-
nity for ports to optimize their operation. Improving the organization and 
timing of ship movements in a busy port to optimize transit, berthing, and 
loading/unloading, for example, can save both ports and shipping companies 
tens of thousands of dollars for every hour of decreased down time.156 Using 
a combination of sensors, gauges, cameras, radio frequency identification, 
and other IoT devices—coupled with advanced technologies such as GNSS, 
internet, Wi-Fi, and 4G/5G mobile communications—container terminals 
can be automated to optimize the interoperation of cargo ships, rail mounted 
gantry cranes, and automated guided vehicles. See figure 8.157
Figure 8. The layout of an automated container terminal. © 2018 IEEE. Reprinted, 
with permission, from Yang et al., “Internet of Things for Smart Ports: Technolo-
gies and Challenges,” IEEE Instrumentation and Measurement Magazine 21, no. 1
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These technologies and ideas are being implemented at ports today. As an 
example, the Port of Rotterdam—which handles 140,000 ships and 461 mil-
lion tons of cargo annually—is working with IBM Corp. to build the “world’s 
smartest port” using IoT technology. Sensors measuring water temperature, 
water depth, speed and direction of current, tide, speed and direction of 
wind, berth availability, and other factors at the 41 square mile (106 square 
kilometer) port will feed centralized information to a dashboard app on 
connected vessels. This data will streamline port operations to reduce wait 
times; optimize dock, load, and unload times; and maximize the throughput 
of vessels at cargo terminals.158 Similar intelligent ship management, intel-
ligent traffic flow, and smart port logistics systems are being built at the Port 
of Le Havre.159
These initiatives are massive implementations of hardware, software, and 
communications, including the development of new apps. But, like all IoT 
components, the potential for attacks on CPS hardware and software is ever 
present. Suppose, for example, a bad actor hacks or otherwise manipulates 
a sensor subsystem to send bogus AIS or smart port app messages; or an 
attacker spoofs AIS clearance time to enter port, marine traffic signal, berth-
ing data, or tidal window messages causing a disruption in vessel traffic. 
The resulting confusion could disrupt port operations potentially for long 
periods of time.
Concluding Observations
While many technologies—including CPS and the internet itself—can be an 
equalizing factor between a large and small organization, agency, or military 
force, too much dependence 
upon technology can also be 
an Achilles’ heel. IoT devices 
on maritime vessels and at 
ports can allow a single person 
to do the work of several, thus 
becoming a force multiplier, 
but overdependence on tech-
nology can cause systemic 
errors, delays, and inefficiencies if that technology fails. Computer-based 
ICS use processor chips, sensors, and other hardware components that are 
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manufactured overseas; malware or backdoors could be inserted into soft-
ware or, Stuxnet-type vulnerabilities could be built into hardware.160 Because 
of the huge number of IoT devices and the relative security weaknesses of 
those devices, CPS is an attractive target for cyberterrorists and adversarial 
cyberwarriors.161
While CPS and IoT have unique cybersecurity challenges, defense of the 
computers at the heart of these systems starts with following best practices 
for securing networked systems such as a defense-in-depth strategy that 
includes anti-malware, firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems, 
and user training. Using red teams to perform external network reconnais-
sance, vulnerability scanning, and penetration testing can also yield a tre-
mendous amount of information to help better secure a network.162 Another 
emerging strategy in the defense of CPS is the use of digital twins, a virtual 
representation of a physical object or process. The U.S. military is already 
using digital twins to secure semiconductors and to test GPS.163 Combining 
IoT software systems with the real time digital twin of managed hardware 
provides a better understanding of the entire CPS system—including the 
weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and potential exploits. With this knowledge, 
operators can better adjust the efficacy and security of their systems.164 One 
such maritime initiative is the ProProS research project at the Fr. Lürssen 
shipyard in Bremen, Germany, which is building a digital twin to control and 
optimize their manufacturing and assembly processes.165 Looking ahead, this 
model for the future—robust systems for counter intrusion as well as digital 
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Chapter 5. Autonomous Vessels
The [vessel] of the future will have only two [crewmembers], a man 
and a dog. The man will be there to feed the dog. The dog will be 
there to keep the man from touching the equipment. - adapted from 
Warren Bennis166
Autonomous maritime vessels, also called maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS), represent a natural convergence of thousands of years 
of evolving ship and harbor technology with decades of evolving computing 
and communications technology. Conceptually, autonomy seems like a good 
fit in the maritime transportation system, particularly in the LZ where there 
is an abundance of vessel traffic and natural hazards that automation can 
help manage and control. But, as discussed earlier in this report, computer-
based systems, most notably operational technology (OT), ICS, and IoT, are 
susceptible to many types of cyberattack. This chapter will review some of 
the drivers for autonomous vessels and their cyber vulnerabilities.167 Appen-
dix 6 contains a background introduction to the topic.
Autonomous military vessels have been a specialized area of research in 
the general field of autonomous ships. Autonomy for military vessels brings 
many of the same advantages as in commercial shipping but, of course, also 
adds the fact that autonomy can be a force multiplier and remove humans 
from places of harm. The U.S. Navy has had a program for developing an 
unmanned surface vessel (USV) fleet since 2012. Several prototype vessels 
have been built or are under development, and have already been tested 
operationally as part of a carrier strike force, and a fleet of seven is expected 
by 2023.168 The Navy has already identified many potential uses for autono-
mous vessels, including roles in missile attack forces; mine search, detection, 
neutralization, and delivery; antisubmarine and surface warfare; support 
of SOF; maritime interdiction and security; and EW.169 While most of the 
USVs are unarmed, the Navy is also testing armed, unmanned patrol boats 
for port security, such as a 40 foot (12 meter) remote-operated USV—armed 
with a .50 caliber machine gun station—to protect warships at anchor.170 As 
with a manned vessel, operation of a USV will be more difficult in the LZ 
than in more open water.
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SOF and Autonomous Vessels
Militaries, policymakers, and malign actors around the globe recognize 
the competitive advantage of autonomous vessels. Much like their airborne 
counterparts, autonomous vessels are cheaper, operate with less human risk, 
and can operate for lengths of time well beyond human capacity. An autono-
mous vessel allows SOF to act from a distance in common operations such 
as hostage rescue and antipiracy. Unmanned vessels can transmit sensory 
data to a remote command post, and some can get close enough to hostile 
maritime vessels to override their controls. Yet, because of their sophistica-
tion, autonomous vessels are especially vulnerable to increasingly complex 
and destructive actions, which poses a unique threat to SOF.
Cyber Threats to Autonomous Vessels
Artificial intelligence (AI), IoT, and mobility systems have been major dis-
rupters in the maritime industry. Autonomous systems in the MTS are at 
the intersection of innovative uses of advanced technology and vulnerabil-
ity to all imaginable cyberattack vectors. Cyber technology is the enabler 
of incredible potential advances but also provides potentially existential 
threat and attack vectors.171 The current environment might be summarized 
as “automation, integration, and remote monitoring meet the internet”:172
• Automation. Maritime machinery and systems are increasingly con-
trolled by software
• Integration. Multiple shipboard systems are increasingly interconnected
• Remote Monitoring/Control. Land-based offices use ship-to-shore 
communication to continuously monitor and/or control shipboard 
equipment
• all these systems are connected to the internet with its 4.5 billion users
Each individual segment above has its own cyber vulnerabilities. As an 
interconnected system, the potential vulnerabilities and cyberattack vec-
tors are so complex as to be impossible to be fully understood, regardless 
of whether this is applied to manned or unmanned maritime vessels. The 
defense requires good software discipline, policies, and controls that limit 
how one system interacts with other systems, as well as implementing the 
best cybersecurity design principles, including:173
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• Isolation. Run tasks so that they cannot communicate with other 
tasks unless there is a trusted relationship.
• Modularity. A task only needs to know how to interface with another 
task but not the internal structure of that other task.
• Minimization of implementation/least common mechanism. Avoid 
sharing parts of security mechanisms among different users, pro-
cesses, and/or parts of the system.
• Complete mediation. All accesses to objects should be checked to 
ensure they are allowed every time access is attempted (i.e., do not 
cache access permissions).
• Least privilege. Processes should be assigned the least level of privi-
lege necessary to perform their task.
• Reluctance to trust/minimize trust surface. Assume that the envi-
ronment in which the system resides is insecure.
To implement any security defense mechanism or protection, a risk 
assessment must be performed to identify the actual threats, vulnerabili-
ties, and exposures, as well as to prioritize those risks.174 Cyber risks for 
autonomous vessels are due to the addition and reliance on ICT, but as all 
autonomous vessels do not have the same level of autonomy, the risk factors 
will vary based upon the vessel’s exposure in cyberspace. Tam and Jones175 
propose a risk assessment model for assessing autonomous vessels—shown in 
table 2—by defining three axes: level of vessel autonomy, value of the exploit 
to the attacker, and ease with which an attack can occur.176
1. On the ship autonomy axis, the highest tier represents the most complex 
target, a fully autonomous vessel, and the vulnerability is a function of 
attack vector, target vulnerability, and effect on the target (e.g., AIS jam-
ming could result in a collision).
2. The attacker reward is a function of attacker type and goal combined with 
target type and effect (e.g., a cybercriminal launching a ransomware attack 
could put a company out of business or garner a huge payoff).
3. Ease of exploit is a function of attacker type and available resources com-
bined with the target type and resources (e.g., a skilled hacking organiza-
tion with standard tools could easily exploit a small vessel’s network that 
does not have adequate cyber defenses). Since this axis measures ease of an 
attack rather than difficulty, the highest tier represents the simplest attack.
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Tier Ship Autonomy Attacker Reward Ease of Exploit
1 Minimal crew 
required
Little to no value for 
attacker; minimal impact
APT, requires capabilities of 
a nation-state
2 Partial autonomation; 
local crew for simple 
tasks





intervention by local 
crew
Average to moderate 
value to attacker
Moderate skills, requiring 
significant resources 
(professional)
4 High autonomy, 
mostly self-running
Valuable to attacker and 
third parties
Minimal skills or resources 
required (basic)
5 Complete autonomy Extremely valuable to all 
players; large-scale or 
significant impact
Little to no skills needed 
(e.g., script kiddies)
The risk matrix can be further refined by identifying specific areas of 
vulnerability.177 Earlier chapters in this monograph have already described 





• voyage data recorders
• intra-vessel network
• vessel-to-land communication
• remote operation systems
• docking systems
While autonomous systems have their own unique issues, the possible 
attacks on MASS are like those described earlier for the MTS as a whole—
such as code injection; tampering and modifying sensors; GNSS spoofing; 
AIS spoofing; signal jamming; and communication link eavesdropping and 
disruption.179
Table 2. Tiers of ship autonomy, attacker reward, and ease of exploit. Source: 
Tam and Jones/Cyber-Risk Assessment for Autonomous Ships
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Concluding Observations
Cybersecurity planning across SOF should follow the “Vulnerabilities 
Trumps Threats Maxim,” which suggests that it is important to focus on 
understanding and addressing the vulnerabilities in a system rather than on 
the perceived threats.180 Organizing a defense around vulnerabilities means 
to plan based upon things that can be identified, mitigated, and, possibly, 
eliminated. Organizing the defense around threats is a poor approach, 
because the threat landscape is constantly changing. Further, if defense is 
designed around threats that are incorrect, the defense may be inadequate 
against an unanticipated threat actor. Focus on vulnerabilities; even if the 
threats are incorrect, a strong defense will be built.
One of the most promising strategies to mitigate the complex vulner-
abilities of autonomous vessels is construction of a digital twin, described 
earlier in this monograph. Autonomous vessels, including ports and mooring 
systems, are enabled by advanced digital technology. Building digital twins 
of these systems is of paramount importance to understanding system com-
plexity and appreciating the new cyber vectors for attacking these systems.181
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Chapter 6. Implications For SOF
No battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy. - Helmuth von 
Moltke the Elder182
Mann traoch, Gott läuch (man plans, God laughs) - Yiddish proverb183
There’s a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it’s not about 
who’s got the most bullets. It’s about who controls the information. 
What we see and hear how we work, what we think ... it’s all about 
the information! - Sneakers184
Historically, cyber defense has been viewed as trying to keep up with an ever-changing environment of cyber threats and vulnerabilities; 
a cycle of “find vulnerabilities, fix them, repeat.” This whack-a-mole form 
of defense all but guarantees that defense will always lag behind methods of 
attack. The overriding implication drawn from this monograph is that IW in 
the LZ will require a new way of thinking. This does not mean merely adapt-
ing old methods to a new battle terrain but of adopting a new philosophy in 
warfare. Consider the futility of the Maginot Line as France, in the 1930s, 
prepared to defend themselves against the previous war with Germany.185 
The same is true in addressing issues of cybersecurity and cyberwarfare.
Today’s cyber defense demands two fundamental changes in philosophy 
and outlook. First, understand that the assets to protect and defend are not 
physical but, rather, logical or virtual. Methods designed to protect physical 
assets are not adequate to protect cyber assets; cyber defenders must protect 
data that needs to be protected everywhere it resides. This requires new orga-
nizational constructs. Second, hierarchical communication structures—be 
they human or machine-based—give the attacker the edge; if an attack needs 
to be reported up through a chain-of-command and sent to a vendor before 
a defense is distributed, attackers have plenty of time to do a lot of damage. 
Instead, defenders need flat, knowledge-based mechanisms that can be used 
to share information amongst appropriate parties at the speed of an attack 
which, in cyberspace, is literally the speed of light. Defenders need to adapt 
to reclaim the cyber advantage from the attacker.186
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Just as autonomous vessels are a disruptive technology in the MTS, mari-
time activities in the LZ are a disruptive force in terms of IW. Leveraging 
disruptive technologies requires special planning and new outlooks. While 
traditional risk management processes and procedures are important to 
apply to these new problems, planners also need to apply non-traditional 
methods to risk assessment, management, and planning. Rather than focus 
risk assessment on specific systems or subsystems within a vessel or an opera-
tional domain, scenario-based planning provides a larger perspective to 
identifying and responding to threats, both cyber and non-cyber. Whereas 
the common cyber risk management approach looks at a static attack on 
individual parts of a system, scenario-based planning provides a tabletop, 
exercise-like opportunity to consider the impacts of a natural or man-
made attack on a cyber system, a planned 
response to such an event, and the next 
steps that might occur due to nature or an 
intelligent actor. In this way, by wargam-
ing and red teaming a host of scenarios, 
planners can better prepare a multifaceted 
cyber defense.187
One scenario-based planning meth-
odology employed by USCG is Evergreen. 
This process is not the typical “what hap-
pens if someone spoofs our GPS?” type of 
planning; on the contrary, it is quite untraditional. Evergreen focuses on 
future planning based upon a vast number of variables—including tech-
nology, politics, the economy, the environment, population demographics, 
and the state of critical infrastructures. Because the future is uncertain, the 
Evergreen process starts with several plausible futures; participants then 
discuss actions that might be taken today to advance to, or avoid, the various 
futures and achieve success down the road. Participants very quickly come 
to understand the complex interrelationships between global parameters and 
variables to identify key uncertainties and major trends. While not cyberse-
curity-specific, Evergreen is a useful process in the cyber domain; it demon-
strates the interconnectedness of the variables in the scenario. Ultimately, 
the process helps participants to better understand the big picture and offers 
better planning advice to organizational leadership.188 This unconstrained 
thinking broadens the perspective of planners so that they might implement 
Rather than focus risk 
assessment on specific sys-
tems or subsystems within 
a vessel or an operational 
domain, scenario-based 
planning provides a larger 
perspective to identifying 
and responding to threats, 
both cyber and non-cyber.
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policies and processes that will lead to an advantageous position further 
down the road; what some call “reverse engineering the future.”189 While 
planners do need to anticipate all contingencies, it is best to proactively try 
to create the optimal conditions to avoid undesirable long-term outcomes.
Concluding Thoughts
This monograph has only touched on the many technology drivers of both 
offensive and defensive actions at the crossroads of maritime operations 
and cyberspace. Each will have a major impact on the way offensive and 
defensive operations are conducted in all domains of war and conflict. These 
technologies will interpret inputs, make decisions, and initiate responses at 
computer speeds so that humans will not be able to keep up with each indi-
vidual action. Computers will also be able to track thousands of seemingly 
unrelated events to anticipate potential adverse actions, and tell a party when 
and how to launch preemptive cyberattacks or position their cyber assets 
accordingly; this also applies to kinetic attacks and defenses.190 The larger 
lesson of cybersecurity is that defense is not about the systems, it is about 
the amount, quality, integrity, timeliness, and availability of information.
For an organization like USSOCOM, that sits at the tip of the spear; 
they must make rapid decisions, planning, organization, recruitment, reten-
tion, and resilience the keys towards building a robust, multidomain defense 
against current and future irregular adversaries. The future is likely to see 
more data-driven operations and reliance on the globally integrated DIB. 
Given the growing complexity of the wartime environment and the types of 
planning required to mitigate and respond to threats, the maritime special 
operator of the future must have the ability to integrate, synthesize, and 
comprehend a wide amount of complex information and process several 
plausible scenarios at once. It will be imperative for commanders and forces 
in the field to quickly orient towards evolving changes on the battlefield. 
This reality has major implications for SOF recruitment and retention. The 
SOF of the future must be able to recruit the most agile-minded warriors, 
and retain intellectually capable and intuitive fighters. Likewise, cadres of 
offensive and defensive cyber specialists, whose primary function is not 
kinetic warfighting, could be integrated within the most tactical of SOF 
communities. Furthermore, USSOCOM will need to develop internal pro-
cesses and a framework to mitigate vulnerabilities in the supply chain and 
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enterprise-level integrated systems. The onus will be upon the command to 
stay flexible for the fight, integrate innovative practices, appeal to the next 
generation of warriors, and organize to respond to new challenges.
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Appendix 1. The Littoral Zone (LZ) in 
Context
Oceanographers classify different parts of the ocean in different ways based 
upon what aspects of the environment they are studying, e.g., topography, 
biology, or physics. One of the common classification systems is based on 
depth. The pelagic zone essentially covers the water column from the surface 
to near the bottom of the sea; the very bottom is the benthic zone. The pelagic 
zone can be further subdivided, based upon the penetration of light; the 
photic zone is the top layer where at least some light penetrates—and, in the 
upper range, photosynthesis can occur. The aphotic zone is the dark water. 
Each of these zones has further subclassifications beyond the scope of this 
monograph, outlined in table 3.191
Table 3. Classification of oceanic zones. Adapted from Webb, 
Introduction to Oceanography.
Zone Description
Pelagic Surface to Near Bottom 
Photic Light Penetration
Aphotic Dark Water
Benthic Bottom of Sea
Littoral Near Shore
While the subdivisions within the pelagic zone are largely based upon 
depth, it is obvious that there is a natural relationship between the height 
of the water column and distance from shore. The most nearshore region is 
the LZ (figure 9). The LZ itself is divided into many subareas, but this zone 
is where the ocean meets the land; it is generally held to extend out to the 
near edge of the continental shelf, to depths of approximately 200 feet (60 
meters).192
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Appendix 2. GNSS and GPS Technical 
Details
GNSS Overview
Satellite navigation systems employ trilateration as a way in which to deter-
mine the latitude, longitude, and altitude of a point on or above the surface 
of the Earth. Trilateration requires communication with three satellites; it 
is the relative distance of the receiver to each of these satellites that provides 
the geolocation capability.193
Each GNSS system uses its own constellation of satellites. Each global 
GNSS constellation employs between 24–35 satellites in a medium Earth 
orbit (MEO) at an altitude of about 12,000–14,500 miles (19,300–23,300 kilo-
meters). At this altitude, each satellite has an orbital period of 11–14 hours, 
making one and a half to two orbits a day; they are visible by a given receiver 
for several hours at a time, as shown in figure 10.194
Figure 10. Geostationary, GNSS MEO, and low Earth orbit satellites are 
compared. Source: Wikimedia
58
JSOU Report 21 -4
A GNSS receiver can determine its ground position using trilateration 
from multiple satellite signals; it is, in essence, a passive ranging system. 
While the satellite transmits a signal at about 50 watts, after traveling thou-
sands of miles the received signal might be as low as 10-16 watts.195 A maritime 
GNSS receiver overlays its position information on a chart to determine such 
information as latitude, longitude, altitude, speed, heading, and estimated 
time of arrival to a destination, as shown in figure 11.
GNSS satellites transmit signals in the UHF L band, which employs radio 
frequencies in the range of 1–2 GHz.196 The satellites typically transmit on 
at least two frequencies simultaneously, commonly called Link 1 (L1) and 
Link 2 (L2). All satellites in a constellation share the L1 and L2 frequencies, 
using a multiplexing scheme called code-division multiple access (CDMA), 
a form of spread spectrum technology also used by mobile phones. Each 
GNSS satellite is assigned a unique pseudorandom noise (PRN)197 sequence, 
which is merely a long string of zeros and ones. The PRN is used to modulate 
the satellite’s transmission on the L band. Receivers know the PRN assigned 
to each satellite, thus allowing them to synchronize with the signal from a 
particular satellite. While the CDMA signal is at an extremely low power 
Figure 11. A typical maritime GPS chartplotter display is shown. Source: Garmin/
used with permission
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level, the code correlation properties of the PRN allow the receiver to recover 
the signal and the information it contains.198
Although geolocation using trilateration only requires three satellites, 
precise GNSS position and timing requires that the receiver acquire a signal 
from four satellites. GNSS positioning is based upon a passive reference to a 
satellite that is moving at a speed of about 2.5 miles a second (4 kilometers a 
second). Trilateration using three satellites provides an approximate location 
with an error of up to one mile (1500 meters) due to a lack of synchronization 
between the satellite’s highly accurate cesium clock and the receiver’s less 
accurate clock. A given receiver’s clock error—or bias—affects all observed 
satellite signal transit times in the same way; meaning that all of the ranges 
will be too short or too long by some common ratio. This is known as a 
pseudorange. By employing a fourth satellite, the pseudorange error can be 
reduced so that the position estimate is within a few feet (1 meter), effectively 
transferring the high accuracy of the satellite clock to the surface receiver.199
In the vernacular of GNSS, the constellation of satellites is called the space 
segment and the collection of receivers is referred to as the user segment. 
The global network of ground facilities that track the satellites, monitor their 
transmissions, and send commands and data to them is called the control 
segment.200
GPS Technical Background
Currently managed by the U.S. Space Force, GPS—officially, NAVSTAR, 
the Global Positioning System—began as a joint project of the U.S. Air Force 
and U.S. Navy in the late 1960s, and is generally considered to be the first 
GNSS.201 While the military originally intended itself to be the sole user of 
GPS, the U.S. government’s posture since the first satellite launch in 1978 has 
been that civilians would have access to the system. Civilian GPS products 
became widely available in the 1990s as the system became fully operational; 
the signal precision was purposely degraded by the introduction of controlled 
timing errors, a feature known as Selective Availability (SA). The civilian-
oriented service is known as the Standard Positioning Service (SPS); the SA 
feature was removed by EO in 2000 and is no longer available in current 
satellites.202 GPS also provides a Precise Positioning Service (PPS) for the 
U.S. military and allied nations.203
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GPS uses a constellation of up to 31 satellites, each of which orbits the 
Earth twice daily. GPS employs three frequencies in the L band for transmis-
sion of navigation messages, denoted L1 (1575.42 megahertz [MHz]204), L2 
(1227.60 MHz), and L5 (1176.45 MHz).205
GPS satellites transmit navigation messages on each frequency at an 
extremely low bit rate (50 bits per second); it takes 12.5 minutes for an entire 
message to be transmitted and then received by a ground station. Navigation 
messages include the following information:206
• GPS date, time, and week number
• satellite status and health
• ephemeris (position and velocity) data
• clock bias parameters
• almanac (coarse ephemeris data for all GPS satellites, allows receivers 
to know which satellites are available for tracking)
A GPS satellite is continually transmitting navigation messages. A GPS 
receiver derives positional information by passively determining the loca-
tion of, and range to, each of the satellites to which it is listening. Part of 
this process necessitates the receiver recovering the clock signal from the 
satellite transmission; the processing power of the receiver has a great deal 
to do with the accuracy and precision of the reported location. The PRN 
codes described above are essential to the recovery of the clock, so they are 
sometimes referred to as ranging codes.207
The L1 band is used to transmit navigation messages and uses two PRN 
codes. The first code, called the coarse/acquisition (C/A) code, was designed 
to support the SPS and is freely available to the public for civilian use and 
standard precision applications; this signal is referred to as L1C. The second 
code is called the precision (P) code and is intended to support military 
PPS.208 The P code is encrypted and becomes known as a Y code, but common 
nomenclature is to refer to this as a P(Y) code. The P(Y) code provides better 
interference resistance than the C/A code, which makes military GPS more 
robust and resistant to spoofing than civilian GPS. The military makes the 
P(Y) code decryption key available to authorized users, including military 
allies.209
Historically, the L2 band was used to transmit the P(Y) code and was 
intended exclusively for military applications. On newer GPS satellites, the 
C/A code is also transmitted on L2—referred to as L2C—providing a second 
61
Kessler/Zorri: Cross Domain IW Threats to SOF Maritime Missions
publicly available code for civilian users. Even newer GPS satellites are trans-
mitting a third civilian signal on the L5 band.210
The National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) defines standards 
for the interface between marine electronics equipment. The NMEA 0183 
interface standard message format is character-based and is commonly used 
on commercial and military vessels.211 As an example, a message containing 
GNSS fix data might appear as:
$GPGGA,123519,1231.225,N,07002.642,W,1,08,0.9,11.4,M,46.9,M,,*62
Among other things, this message indicates that it was sent by a GPS 
device at 12:35:19 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC),212 is at a position of 
12°31.225'N, 070°02.642'W and an altitude of 11.4 meters (e.g., the receiver is 
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Appendix 3. AIS Technical Details
AIS Overview
The AIS is a tracking system whereby vessels and shore stations within a 
10–20 nautical mile range can exchange position, course, and other vessel-
related information. With this system, vessels at sea are aware of each other’s 
presence; maritime authorities in littoral states can identify and monitor ves-
sels and cargo in their area of responsibility; and navigation, meteorological, 
safety, and other items of information can be exchanged between ships and 
shore stations, including ports. The need for AIS was prompted by the oil spill 
caused when Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince William Sound, Alaska 
in 1989. AIS was designed as a maritime situational awareness system in the 
1990s and was adopted internationally in the 2002 International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).214
SOLAS Chapter V “Safety of Navigation” requires ships of a certain size 
and/or function to carry AIS transceivers as a necessary safety measure, 
along with radar, radios, and life jackets. In the U.S., this same mandate is 
found in the United States Code of Federal Regulations.215 Ships of 300 or 
more gross tons traveling internationally, commercial power vessels of 65 
or more feet (19.8 or more meters) in length, and power vessels certified to 
carry more than 150 passengers are among the vessels required to carry AIS 
Class A devices. Warships are specifically exempted from these requirements, 
although most modern warships have AIS capability, including the ability 
to shut it off and/or operate in an encrypted mode.216 Class B devices can 
be employed on vessels that use AIS but have no legal requirement to do so, 
such as large yachts and small fishing boats. AIS devices generally transmit 
position information messages every 2–180 seconds, depending upon the 
ship’s class, speed, and rate-of-turn. Class A devices generally transmit more 
detailed information with more power than do Class B devices.217
AIS has evolved to be an essential part of a ship’s navigation system 
and is used today primarily for situational awareness and collision avoid-
ance among ships, vessel traffic management, and coastal surveillance.218 A 
ship using an AIS receiver can view the local traffic and quickly determine 
another ship’s name, its International Maritime Organization registration 
number, size (length, beam, and draft), position (latitude and longitude), 
64
JSOU Report 21 -4
course, heading, destination, cargo, status (anchored, moored, underway 
under power or sail, etc.), and other information as shown figures 12 and 
13. AIS gathers its location information from the ship’s GNSS so is highly 
dependent upon the integrity of the navigation system.
Figure 12. Typical Class A AIS display and control unit with radar-like display of 
nearby targets is shown. Source: Clipper, Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 3.0
Figure 13. Chartplotter display including AIS data, shows ships in the local area. 
Source: Wikimedia Commons public domain
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There are many active components in the AIS network, shown in figure 
14. In addition to ships and boats, other mobile stations include AIS SAR 
transponders, man overboard transmitters, Emergency Position Indicating 
Radio Beacons, AIS-equipped satellites, and SAR aircraft. Fixed AIS stations 
include AIS base stations, repeaters, and specially equipped aids-to-naviga-
tion. GNSS satellites are not a direct component of AIS, but they provide 
essential geographic positioning information to all the mobile components.219
AIS Technical Background
AIS is a radio-broadcast communication system, using very high frequency 
channels 87B (161.975 MHz) and 88B (162.025 MHz) in the maritime band. 
Radio transmission aspects of AIS, including frequency sharing and time 
slot reservation schemes, as shown in figure 15, are described in Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union, Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R) 
Recommendations M.585-8 and M.1371-5.220 The primary AIS identifier is the 
Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI), uniquely assigned to all vessels 
by international standardization and local maritime authorities.221
Figure 14. Stations in the AIS network are shown. Source: Gary C. Kessler
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The AIS communication protocols are defined in a family of NMEA 
standards:
• NMEA 0183 defines character-based message formats at speeds up to 
38,400 bits per second over a serial connection222
• NMEA 2000® describes binary message formats at speeds up to 
250,000 bits per second running over the Controller Area Network 
(CAN) bus223
• OneNet describes a protocol using binary messages over the internet 
protocol (IP) version 6 and Ethernet at gigabit speeds, and introduces 
security mechanisms for transmissions224
The NMEA AIS protocols are used for inter-device communication 
aboard a vessel. NMEA 0183 has been adopted in ITU-R Rec. M.1371 for 
over-the-air transmission of AIS information.
The following example of a Type 1 (position report Class A) message 
demonstrates how AIS transmissions might appear to an AIS device. Sup-
pose a device has the following information to send:
• MMSI = 367354360
• Navigation status = Underway using engine
• Rate of turn = 11.999° per minute to starboard
• Latitude = 41.3541750°
• Longitude = -072.0903817°
• Speed over ground = 5.21 knots
• Course over ground = 5.099°
• True heading = 17.000°
• UTC timestamp = 29 seconds
Figure 15. Frequency sharing in the AIS network uses self-organized time division 
multiple access. Source: AIS Reporter/used with permission
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NMEA 0183-formatted messages are among the most common in use 
by commercial vessels, including some recreational and military vessels. 
NMEA 0183 messages are used for inter-device communication on a ship 
and have been adopted in International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
Recommendation M.1371 for over the air transmission of AIS information. 
An NMEA 0183/ITU M.1371 message with the information above would be 
transmitted over the air as:
!AIVDM,1,1,,A,15NEQv02hlJmwiFGbKn@<hRr0000,0*43
NMEA 2000-formatted messages are used for inter-device communica-
tion aboard a ship. This standard is common on recreational vessels and 
those commercial and military vessels using modern AIS equipment. An 
NMEA 2000 message with the information above might appear as:
040EF801FF0289F811001C01F861E51577E107D57625A618757A030C0144C000970B2E1AC0F800
The OneNet standard is very new, and equipment employing this protocol 
is not expected to appear before the end of 2021. Like NMEA 2000, OneNet 
will be used for inter-device communication aboard a vessel.
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Appendix 4. Malware Tutorial
An Introduction to Malware
Most common definitions of cybersecurity focus on the protection of com-
puters, servers, networks, and the internet from deliberate attack and com-
promise.225 The DOD definition of cyberspace security is much more global 
and focused:
Actions taken within protected cyberspace to prevent unauthorized 
access to, exploitation of, or damage to computers, electronic com-
munications systems, and other information technology, including 
platform information technology, as well as the information con-
tained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.226
The important distinction here is the focus on the bottom-line: informa-
tion. Prior to the adoption of terms such as cybersecurity and cyberspace secu-
rity, the practice was called information security or information assurance, 
providing the focus on the information itself rather than on the containers 
and communication pathways.227 Textbooks today still talk about the so-
called Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability Triad and Parkerian Hexad 
when describing characteristics of information, and there is a fair amount 
of overlap with the DOD terms:228
• Confidentiality refers to protecting information from unauthorized 
access or disclosure.
• Integrity refers to the state of information being free from inadvertent 
or deliberate manipulation.
• Availability refers to the users’ ability to access information when needed.
• Possession, or control, refers to the loss of data by the authorized user 
(even if the “thief” cannot access the data).
• Authenticity, also known as authentication, refers to being able to prove 
the identity of the sender of information.
• Utility refers to the usefulness of the data to the user. Examples of low 
utility are possessing encrypted data without a decryption key; or receiv-
ing a message to do something after the date when the action is required.
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The last part of the DOD definition, nonrepudiation, means that the 
owner of information or the sender of a message cannot deny their owner-
ship or authorship, respectively.
Definitions of malware often focus on the intentional disruption to the 
operation of computers and communications systems, including user sys-
tems, servers, local networks, and the internet.229 The real issue is that mal-
ware represents an attack on these characteristics of information; if we lose 
any one of these, the success of an operation or any data-based activity 
cannot be assured.
The use of malware and other attacks on computers and networks are 
tools commonly used by cybercriminals, cyberterrorists, and military infor-
mation operators. Individual hackers and hacker groups can be acting for 
their own purposes, such as Anonymous; for hire, such as Lizard Squad, 
as state-sponsored actors, such as Syrian Electronic Army; or directly on 
behalf of a nation-state, such as People’s Liberation Army [PLA] Unit 61398.
Malware Types and Techniques
There are many types of malware that manifest in different ways. Almost 
all malware is insinuated into a computer or network by a user opening 
an attached file to an email, downloading an infected file from an internet 
site, or otherwise responding to directions provided in a message from an 
“unknown” user. It is important to note that the term computer is a broad 
one; mobile devices such as tablets and cell phones are as susceptible to 
malware as a laptop or desktop system.230
Historically, malware has been categorized as a virus, worm, or Trojan. 
A virus is a nefarious program that is activated when executed by the user, 
such as when double-clicking on a file attachment to an e-mail. Once active, 
a virus can do almost anything on the system—slowly delete data; cause the 
computer’s performance to degrade; make the computer part of a zombie 
network; or allow the system to become a jumping off point for another 
attack. Once installed, some viruses can automatically restart—even after 
they are discovered and closed, or the system rebooted. Spyware is a particu-
lar type of virus that collects keystrokes, contents of the system clipboard, 
screenshots, user logon credentials, and other information; it then uploads 
what it collects to an attacker’s site. In one form or another, viruses have 
been infecting computers since the 1980s. In that era, the most common 
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form of distribution was via floppy disk software distribution or individual 
file sharing, and it could take months or years for a virus to hit a critical 
mass; by the early 1990s, commercial e-mail services and the internet greatly 
accelerated the time and ease for distribution.231
Worms can replicate and forward themselves to other systems. Worms use a 
variety of methods to propagate; one common method is to examine the e-mail 
address book of the infected system and forward itself to all addresses found 
therein. Another method is to advance via open network shares. Like viruses, 
worms can do just about anything to the host computer once they are active. 
Because of their ability to self-replicate, even a worm without a malicious 
payload can degrade the performance of a computer by usurping processing 
power, or of a network by consuming bandwidth. The concept of a worm has 
been around since the early days of the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Network—the forerunner of the internet. The first worm to cause any sort of 
damage was The Internet Worm in 1988.232 Worms are now the common way in 
which malware makes its way around the internet, and worm-based malware 
can hit critical mass on the internet within minutes or hours.233
Trojans, or Trojan horses, are programs that purport to do one thing but 
also contain additional, malicious functionality. Trojan horse software is 
often found as an e-mail attachment or Web site download, but there is also 
often some form of social engineering—manipulation of people—involved, 
such as someone on an e-mail list touting a new, wonderful game or appli-
cation. Remote Access Trojans (RATs) are distributed by “customer service 
representatives,” asking a user to download software so that the representa-
tive can share the screen with the user. These programs allow a bad actor to 
totally control the system. RATs and other Trojans are also distributed at 
some gaming, music sharing, and pornography Web sites where users are 
told to download special viewing software.234 While Trojan software gener-
ally works as advertised, it also inserts additional malware which remains on 
the system even if the parent software is subsequently deleted; an example 
is CoinTicker, a Mac OS X application that monitors the current price of 
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, and installs malicious backdoor pro-
grams that could allow an attacker to gain access to a user’s cryptocurrency 
wallet.235 Consider also ToTok, a messaging app introduced in 2019 that 
was downloaded millions of times by users around the world before being 
revealed to be a United Arab Emirates (UAE) intelligence service surveillance 
tool. Likewise, the smartphone video app TikTok was banned by branches 
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of the U.S. military because it was reportedly sending information back to 
its Chinese developer.236 Trojans are a particular concern where operational 
systems have an internet connection, because the malware and its covert 
communications channels are totally hidden behind a useful facade.
Viruses and Trojans are pervasive on mobile devices, particularly the 
Android operating system. Mobile devices are an especially attractive target 
for attackers because of the incredible amount of personal information on 
those devices, including e-mail and text messages, photographs, financial 
and health information, logon credentials for a work network, and more. 
Information-stealing software is as likely to target mobile devices as it is 
personal computers.
Lastly, bogus hardware can also be employed as a vector with which to 
upload malware to a computing device. One such example is the O.MG cable, 
an Apple Lightning cable for charging an iPhone from a USB source. The 
USB connector on the O.MG cable contains an IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi chip that 
allows an attacker to take control of the cable and, if the cable is connected 
to a Mac computer, provides the attacker an entry with which to exploit the 
Mac. The O.MG cable looks identical to the Apple USB Lightning cable.237
Phishing and Watering Hole Attacks
Phishing is a form of social engineering, whereby a message comes from 
what appears to be a legitimate source and asks users for some form of 
personal, sensitive information—such as name, address, social security or 
military identification card number, credit card information, or logon cre-
dentials. Phishing is fraud and uses trickery, manipulation, and, in some 
cases, intimidation, for its success. The goals of phishing are generally for an 
attacker to perpetrate some financial fraud or identity theft, but these same 
schemes can also be used for intellectual property theft, access to sensitive 
information, or intelligence gathering. Different forms of phishing can be 
used to achieve these myriad goals.238
“Traditional” phishing generally refers to attempted fraud by use of an 
e-mail containing an urgent message directing the user to a bogus, but legiti-
mate looking Web site. The user is asked for all sorts of personal information 
and, upon submission, is typically redirected to the actual legitimate Web 
site. Users tricked by this scheme often do not realize that they entered data 
at a bogus site.239
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Pharming is a more sophisticated form of phishing. Knowing that many 
users look in their browser’s address bar to see if the web address of a page 
appears valid, attackers create a two-step attack. In the first step, the local 
Domain Name System (DNS)240 name server is manipulated so that a legiti-
mate website’s name is associated with the bogus website’s IP address.241 In 
the second step, the user is directed to go to the website. At this point, even 
if the user types the address directly into the browser rather than click on 
the link, the correct address will appear in the address bar—although the 
displayed page will be at the bogus site.242
A spear phishing attack comprises messages specifically directed at 
individuals with some form of common interest, such as financial officers, 
employees who attended a meeting or class together, etc. Members of the 
military are often targeted by spear phishing attacks. For example, news of 
some activity is mentioned in the press or information about crew members 
of a vessel or team members of a group are somehow acquired by an adver-
sary. Spear phishing messages can be highly personalized and made to be 
very convincing. Whaling is a variant of spear phishing, where messages are 
directed at senior executives, commanders, or other high-profile individuals 
within an organization or unit.243
Not all phishing comes via e-mail. Vishing, or voice phishing, is a phish-
ing scam using the voice network, usually employing a synthesized voice 
because these are robot calls. Messages usually tell victims about some activ-
ity that requires that they provide their credit card or bank account number; 
ask for an immediate callback in order to pay off a non-existent bank debt; 
settle a tax judgment from the Internal Revenue Service; or avoid being 
arrested. On mobile phones, the caller’s number is often spoofed so that it 
appears to come from the same area code as the target. Similarly, smish-
ing, or short message service phishing, uses text messages as the vector for 
phishing.244
There are many common themes to phishing messages that cause indi-
viduals to provide their personal information, such as:
• there has been a compromise to a credit card or bank account
• there is a questionable purchase charged to your account
• respond to a bogus confirmation of a purchase
• notification of winning a sweepstakes, lottery, gift card, or other award
• an unsolicited job offer
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• information required to continue benefits (e.g., Social Security), keep 
an account open, receive a tax credit, repair/validate a database, or 
avoid going to jail
• requesting information to authenticate your identity and confirm 
your continued availability on your local volunteer fire department, 
ambulance service, or reserve unit during times of imminent natural 
disaster or weather event
Although not a phishing attack, per se, Watering Hole attacks are a 
focused form of manipulation that target groups with a common interest. 
The attacker starts by gathering intelligence on the target victims to deter-
mine or observe what websites the group often frequents; for example, if the 
target victims go to the same sports or news website every morning. If the 
attacker cannot find such a website, a sophisticated adversary might create 
such a website specifically in order to attract the targets to one place.
The next step is for the attacker to somehow insert malware into the 
common website. Over time, the malware will infect susceptible user sys-
tems. As systems within the target organization get infected, the attacker 
can start to access information or otherwise manipulate the compromised 
targets. Even groups of users that are resistant to phishing and spearphishing 
will be victimized by watering hole attacks because of users’ inherent trust 
in the security of websites.245
DoS/distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), Botnets, and Zombies
While traditional malware infects computer systems, there is another form 
of attack on the availability of information that can serve the purposes of an 
adversary: a DoS. The most secure network in the world with the best data 
is all for naught if no one can access the data.
DoS attacks generally succeed against their targets using a resource 
exhaustion strategy. Probably the first intentional internet DoS attack 
occurred in 1996 when someone started flooding Panix—one of the oldest 
internet service providers in the world—with 150 packets per second (70 
kilobits per second) of connection requests that were intentionally never 
completed. In this way, Panix servers allocated all their memory buffers to 
pending connections, which effectively blocked new connections from being 
created.246 It was not technically difficult to launch this attack, yet it was so 
new at the time that Panix was down for several days while a defense was 
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mounted. In 2005, another DoS was launched against Panix when someone 
hijacked their domain name, disrupting access to their network for a couple 
of days.247
Another form of a DoS attack is to flood the victim’s website with enough 
data to consume all the bandwidth on the internet connection. While a 
viable form of attack, it only works if the attacker has more bandwidth than 
the target.
A problem with any form of DoS, from the attacker’s perspective, is that 
the source of the data packets can be traced back to the originator and attri-
bution accurately made. In 1999, the first DDoS attack was used to disable 
the computer network at the University of Minnesota for two days.248 In a 
DDoS, hundreds or thousands of computers are compromised with malware 
that puts them under control of the attacker; these systems are often called 
daemons or zombies and the collection of these systems is called a botnet. 
When the attacker wishes to launch one form or another of DoS on a victim, 
a message is sent to the compromised systems directing them to send their 
DoS payload to the victim site. The combined bandwidth of all the zombies 
is sure to exceed that of the victim site; two of the largest DDoS attacks to 
date occurred within days of each other, in 2018, when GitHub was flooded 
with data rates of up to 1.35 terabits per second (Tbps), and Arbor Networks 
was flooded with up to 1.7 Tbps.249
The GitHub and Arbor Networks DDoS are worth examining more 
closely, as they may represent a harbinger of things to come. These DDoS 
attacks employed a method known as broadcast amplification, exploiting a 
weakness in software known as memcached. The memory caching daemon or 
service on Linux, Unix, and Windows servers is used to cache, or temporarily 
store, data in memory in order to speed up processing on large data stores—
such as disks and databases—and is commonly employed in cloud-based 
services to reduce response time.250 Because memcached does not employ 
authentication, an attacker can send a message to one or more memcached 
servers while spoofing the IP address of the intended victim; in these cases, 
GitHub and Arbor Networks. An attacker can cause a small amount of data 
sent to the target server(s) to be amplified tens of thousands of times when 
forwarded to the victim; in this attack, a single 203-byte request resulted in 
a 100 megabyte251 response. While patches for this vulnerability are avail-
able, studies estimated that there were more than 100,000 known, unpatched 
memcached servers on the internet in late 2018. If a nation-state wanted to 
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use this form of attack, they could, presumably, leave unpatched servers on 
the internet just for this purpose.
One of the biggest dangers from DDoS attacks is that the attacker does 
not need to have any special access to the target victim’s network to cause a 
disruption or outright blockage. Thus, any operational network is at risk of 
this type of attack by an organized adversary. While there are manual and 
automatic methods to mitigate the impact of a DDoS attack, there is always a 
time lag between the initiation of an attack and the ability of the network to 
respond and adapt. A DoS attack can be timed in such a way as to coincide 
with a kinetic event, either as part of an offensive or defensive action.
Ransomware
Ransomware is a form of malware that, as the name implies, locks a user out 
of a computer system unless the user pays a ransom. While the first form of 
malware extortion is thought to be the AIDS Trojan in 1989, modern forms 
of ransomware have been around since about 2012; it has been one of the top 
forms of cyber malware since about 2016.
Ransomware can be distributed as a virus or worm and can target tra-
ditional computer systems as well as mobile devices. The ransomware will 
Figure 16. Screen shot is shown of WannaCry ransomware. Source: Wikimedia 
Commons CC BY-SA 4.0
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generally encrypt the system’s files or otherwise make the system inaccessible 
to the user, and then demand ransom for the user to recover the decryption 
key (figure 16). In most cases, the ransom demand requires payment of a cer-
tain amount of money within a few days, then doubles for a few more days, 
and then expires; this gives users little time to try any decryption efforts, 
which generally will fail. Payments are commonly made by anonymous cryp-
tocurrencies, such as Bitcoin or Monero. In most cases, the decryption key 
is delivered to the victim upon payment because distribution of ransomware 
is generally a criminal endeavor and the attacker just wants the money; if 
word got out that the key was not distributed, other victims would not pay 
the ransom. Note that many forms of ransomware have a help line for the 
victim to learn how to create a cryptocurrency wallet and transfer funds. 
An alternative form of ransomware is where an attacker downloads sensitive 
files and threatens to release them unless a ransom is paid.252
Nothing limits ransomware to cybercriminals and opportunistic crime. 
Consider the memcached DDoS attack described previously. The payload in 
some versions of the memcached attack include a ransom note repeated over 
and over; figure 17 shows a demand for 50 Monero cryptocurrency that can 
be paid to the address shown in the message.253
Ransomware is increasingly used to target health care, financial, and 
public sector sites around the world. More than 200 local and state munici-
palities have been targeted in the U.S. since 2013, in such locations as Albany, 
Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit, Las Vegas, Riviera Beach Florida, 
Figure 17. Ransom demand as part of memcached attack payload is shown. 
Source: Brian Krebs/used with permission
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and San Antonio; indeed, 22 cities in Texas were hit in a single attack in 
2019. Nearly 50 U.S. local and state law enforcement agencies have also been 
victimized.254 A common thread of these attacks is that—due largely to a 
lack of comprehensive disaster recovery and business continuity plans—
their operations ground to a halt, employees lost internet and e-mail access, 
departments had to resort to pen and paper, and records were lost.
There is little question that ransomware will continue to be used as a 
cyberweapon of nation-states and cybercriminals. The problem will undoubt-
edly get worse with increased deployment of IoT and smart devices. Hackers 
selling ransomware-as-a-service will make these types of attacks easier, more 
organized, and more prevalent by any number of bad actors.255
APTs
APTs refers to a cyberthreat that targets a specific organization or sector 
and combines all the tools in the hacking toolkit—from social engineering 
and exploiting vulnerabilities to phishing and distributing malware. While 
the attack might be deflected for a while, the attacker does not go away.256
APTs are so named because each word offers a characteristic of the type 
of attack:257
• Advanced. Attackers use a broad array of tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs), employing commercial, open source, and their 
own private computer and network intrusion tools; the methodology 
is advanced even if the individual tools are not.
• Persistent. These attacks are targeted rather than opportunistic; they 
generally employ low-and-slow techniques to avoid detection. The goal 
is long-term access rather than short-term disruption.
• Threat. APT actors have the capability and intent to do harm, gener-
ally being coordinated actions sponsored by nation-states or highly 
organized groups.
The APT term was coined in early 2010 related to an event called Opera-
tion Aurora. During the latter half of 2009, Google and reportedly dozens of 
other organizations—including Adobe Systems, Juniper Networks, Northrop 
Grumman, Symantec, and Yahoo!—were targeted by the Chinese PLA Unit 
61398.258 Google claimed that intellectual property had been stolen and 
accounts of Chinese dissidents targeted. The attack exploited a vulnerabil-
ity in Internet Explorer that had been reported to Microsoft in September 
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2009, but not yet patched. As a result of this attack, Google closed its Chinese 
operation.259
As suggested in figure 18, an APT is organized and focused. According 
to early analysis of Operation Aurora by Mandiant, there are several distinct 
phases in the attack; although this model had been modified over time, the 
basics still hold:260
• Initial Reconnaissance. Using public information sources, the 
attacker identifies potential targets by learning about the organiza-
tional structure, key individuals, servers, the network architecture, 
network services and possible vulnerabilities, and other information 
posted at the organizational website or social media.
• Initial Compromise. Using TTPs such as social engineering, phishing, 
or exploiting a vulnerability on a server system, the attacker inserts 
some malicious code that provides an entrée into the network.
• Establish Foothold. Once in, the attacker ensures continued access to 
the compromised system by creating a hidden account for themselves 
or installing additional utilities or malware.
• Escalate Privileges. Further exploitation of the compromised system 
yields the attacker a higher level of privilege, allowing greater access 
to systems and data.
• Internal Reconnaissance. Now on the inside of the target network, the 
attacker can gain a better understanding of the environment, which 
individuals provide the best route to additional data and the location 
of key databases and control systems.
• Lateral Movement. Having identified other target computers within 
the network, the attacker uses their privilege to move from system to 
system via network shares or remote access tools and services.
• Maintain Presence. Once an attacker moves on to a new system, 
they can use it to continue learning about the compromised network 
environment and to ensure continued access to the environment—
even if their presence is detected on another system. Again, the use 
of malware, backdoors, remote access software, and virtual private 
network software might be employed.
• Complete Mission. Once the attacker accomplishes their goal—be it 
to steal intellectual property, operational plans, organizational infor-
mation, logistics and personnel information, personally identifiable 
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information, or other data—they often allow the active operation to 
go dormant, but they leave their access intact in case they wish to 
come back later.
APTs are an insidious attack, rarely showing signs of hostile activity in 
their early stages. If invoked by a nation-state, these actions are in further-
ance of long-term goals; indeed, tomorrow’s adversary might already be 
preparing today with APT planning.
Zero-day Exploits
All malware leverages vulnerabilities in software. Software vendors generally 
fix vulnerabilities as they are discovered, but the sheer volume of program 
errors mean that the vendors must prioritize which flaws get patched and 
which ones do not during any given patch cycle. Generally, the most serious 
get fixed the soonest; some flaws remain for months or years while others 
never rise to a level serious enough to get fixed, unless or until they are 
actually exploited.
The term zero-day exploit is applied to malware that exploits a vulner-
ability that either was unknown or not patched before the malware struck. 
In either case, the immediate consequence is that there is no short-term 
defense while victims try to gain situational awareness to understand what 
is happening.261 Operation Aurora, described previously, is a perfect example. 
The attackers against Google and others started in mid-2009 via the exploit 
of a previously unknown Internet Explorer vulnerability. Microsoft became 
aware of the vulnerability in September 2009 but did not create a patch 
for another month or two. The attack against Google essentially ended in 
December but was not publicized until January 2010.262
Zero-days have been stockpiled by any number of groups engaging in 
offensive information operations, largely sponsored by nation-states. These 
groups look for obscure vulnerabilities specifically to weaponize the exploit; 
these have become tactical assets to use in strategic cyberattacks, since they 
can only be used once to temporarily disrupt an adversary. Most major soft-
ware vendors have bug bounty programs, paying individuals to find major 
flaws in their software; some people will sell vulnerabilities they find to the 
highest bidder—or, in some cases, to multiple bidders.263
Perhaps the most public demonstration of the weaponization of zero-day 
exploits is the NSA/CIA Toolkit. In 2016, a hacker group called The Shadow 
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Brokers announced that they possessed a set of cyberattack tools developed 
by the NSA and CIA—including several zero-days that target a wide range 
of systems. The Shadow Brokers released the first set of files, called Vault 7, 
to WikiLeaks in March 2017 and, subsequently, nearly two dozen more sets 
of files were released over the next six months. The tools included hacks and 
zero-day exploits for all major operating systems, Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) applications, smart televi-
sions and other IoT devices, and many types of routers.264
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Appendix 5. CPS Tutorial
OT and ICS and IoT, oh my!265
CPS refers to the engineering problem of merging the physical and cyber worlds. There are a lot of terms and concepts used when talking about 
CPS that all appear to describe the same things, and that will be the focus 
of this section.266
OT is an umbrella term that encompasses the various technologies that 
enable the cyber and physical worlds to come together (figure 19). OT sys-
tems are those where computers directly interact with physical processes by 
near-real-time monitoring and/or control of physical devices such as valves, 
pumps, production lines, the power grid, dams, transportation systems, and 
much more.267
ICS represent a major segment within the OT sector and is composed of 
systems used to monitor and control industrial processes, such as factory 
Figure 19. The components of CPS and the IoT are shown. Source: Gary C. Kessler
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floor automation, power consumption management of electricity grids, 
wind farm controls, or vessel management systems. ICS specifically refers 
to computing systems used to manage industrial operations and other CPS 
applications as opposed to the more common ICT systems that manage 
administrative operations; put another way, ICS controls the physical world 
and ICT systems manage data.268
The requirements of ICS software and hardware in an operational envi-
ronment are quite different than those of ICT systems in a normal business 
environment. These differences are primarily found in the characteristics of 
performance, system reliability, and security priorities. As seen in table 4, 
ICS applications require real-time, low-delay, high-availability hardware and 
software. Because of these requirements and the large number of installed 
systems, the components need to be thoroughly tested prior to deployment. 
Indeed, some of the embedded ICSs are used as part of licensed or regulated 
systems, so that any updates and modifications require certification by some 
authorizing agency. The implications of system failure—or security vulner-
abilities—can also be catastrophic well beyond the device itself, potentially 
threatening the environment, safety to people or equipment, or the business 
unit’s very future.269




Response must be reliable Response is time-critical
High throughput required Modest throughput accepted
High delay and jitter accepted Requires low delay and jitter
Reliability
Scheduled operation Continuous operation (24/7/365)
Occasional failures tolerated Outages intolerable
Beta testing in field acceptable Thorough testing prior to deployment
Modifications possible with little paperwork Formal certification of changes often required
Security Priorities
Risk Impact: Loss of data confidentiality, integ-
rity and availability; business operations
Risk Impact: Environmental, safety, business 
operations
Recover by rebooting Fault-tolerance/redundancy essential
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Figure 20 shows the architecture of a generic ICS. The core of the system 
itself is generally the feedback loop composed of sensors, controllers, and 
actuators that manage some controlled process. The sensor measures some 
physical property and sends this information as a set of variables to the con-
troller. The controller, in turn, interprets the signals and generates appropri-
ate instructions, based upon some control algorithm and desired set points, 
which are sent to actuators. Based on the controller’s instructions, actua-
tors directly manipulate the controlled process via control valves, breakers, 
switches, motors, and other physical devices. Much of this activity can be 
automated since a human might not be able to respond as quickly as the 
system’s changing state demands. Indeed, the human-machine interface 
(HMI) is generally for high-level functions such as setting and adjusting 
operational parameters for the controller, monitoring system activity, dis-
playing status information, and reviewing system history rather than for 
moment-by-moment system control. Diagnostics and maintenance utilities 
also provide overall monitoring of the system to prevent, detect, and respond 
to abnormal operation or failures.270
Figure 20. ICS operation. Source: NIST SP 800-82
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A complete discussion of the myriad uses for ICS is beyond the scope 
of this monograph, but suffice to say that such systems vary widely in their 
feedback loop timing and response time requirements, geographic distri-
bution, fault tolerance, control complexity, architecture, redundancy, and 
impact upon failure.271 Further discussion of ICS will focus on information 
relevant to maritime applications.
ICS include a variety of control system configurations, including pro-
grammable logic controllers (PLC), distributed control systems (DCS), and 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. A PLC, at its 
heart, is merely a special purpose—often ruggedized—computer used to 
control hardware devices in an industrial automation environment. The PLC 
might be realized as a controller board interface in a computer or, built as 
a specialized piece of hardware; in either case, the PLC receives data from 
sensors and other input devices, processes the data per some preprogrammed 
algorithm, and sends control data to the hardware devices being managed. 
The PLC might be a stand-alone device with its own HMI display/keyboard, 
or part of a distributed network of PLCs communicating to some central 
controller.272
A DCS is a control system for some process that generally includes many 
feedback loops distributed amongst many computerized controllers, without 
a central management system. A DCS might be built as a set of networked 
PLCs, each autonomous but reporting back to a central operator’s HMI sta-
tion; it is the DCS that provides the logic of the distributed system and the 
PLCs are the subsystems that implement the control function.273
Shipboard automation employs ICS, SCADA, and other CPS/IoT standard 
communications models. The automated systems employ an HMI with moni-
tors, keyboards, joysticks, touchscreen panels, etc.; a controlling or supervi-
sory computer; PLCs to control the hardware valves, switches, motors, and 
other hardware; and a communications network connecting the various 
components, primarily using NMEA standards over serial lines, the CAN 
bus, Ethernet, wireless, or other media.
SCADA systems provide a central management platform from which 
operators can monitor, manage, and maintain situational awareness about a 
distributed ICS. SCADA systems integrate data communications, a graphical 
HMI, and data acquisition capabilities so that operators can easily observe 
the status of the system, quickly detect abnormal activity or system status, 
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and intuitively adjust managed processes. The primary components of 
SCADA systems are:274
• SCADA display unit, a graphic display HMI showing status messages 
and alarms.
• Remote terminal units (RTUs), often geographically dispersed from 
the central control station but close to the process being managed or 
monitored; a PLC or DCS can act as an RTU.
• A control unit attaches the RTU to the SCADA system, passing data 
between the RTU and central controller in real-time with low latency.
• Communication links, ranging from high-speed local Ethernet to 
wide-area leased lines or radio.
DCS and SCADA are similar systems but there are a couple of important 
differences. First, SCADA assumes a central management point whereas DCS 
does not. Second, DCS is process-driven, meaning that it operates sequen-
tially step-by-step, implements the programmed processes, and responds to 
inputs by its controller when necessary; SCADA systems are event-driven, 
meaning that the system waits for an event to occur that requires an action. 
Finally, DCS is intended for a system distributed over a relatively small geo-
graphic area; SCADA is designed for exceptionally large geographic areas.275
CPS and IoT Cybersecurity Issues
A typical CPS consists of two primary components—physical devices, and 
computers where the computers monitor and/or control the physical devices. 
Where there are computers, there are cyber vulnerabilities and the computer 
processors that comprise CPS and IoT networks are no exception. ICS are 
complex systems prone to vulnerabilities that can be due to the system archi-
tecture and design, user policies, configuration and maintenance policies and 
procedures, the physical system, software development, and the communica-
tion and network configuration. Threats can also come from many sources 
including adversarial threat actors; accidental actions by users; structural 
failures of equipment, controls, or software; or environmental failures due 
to natural disaster, man-made disaster, or external infrastructure failure 
outside the control of the system. These threats affect CPS and IoT across 
all critical infrastructure sectors, including healthcare, telecommunica-
tions, agriculture, energy, and transportation.276 A complete overview of 
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cybersecurity threats in this domain is beyond the scope of this monograph, 
but a few examples will suffice to demonstrate some of the issues.
While common malware directly attacks computer systems, there are 
variants that target hardware via their computer controllers. One of the first 
demonstrations of a software attack on hardware was the Aurora Generator 
Test conducted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2007.277 
Generators, motors, and other components in many critical infrastructure 
sectors—including energy, transportation, oil and gas, and water—employ 
digital protective relays that control circuit breakers. These relays ensure that 
the hardware remains synchronized and functions within proper operational 
parameters. The Aurora test was a controlled hack into a 27-ton generator’s 
control system, where relays were disabled, thus holding circuit breakers 
open for an amount of time sufficient for the machine to slip out of sync and 
subsequently vibrate so violently that it broke itself apart. The test required 
less than three minutes to be successful.278
Possibly the first malware in the wild known to attack hardware was 
Stuxnet, a Microsoft Windows-based worm that was discovered in 2010. The 
Stuxnet worm employed several zero-days exploits and targeted a particular 
type of Siemens centrifuge known to be used at Iranian uranium enrichment 
facilities. The worm was believed to be initially introduced by USB thumb 
drives but also propagated via local networks and, presumably, the internet. 
First, the malware targeted only Windows systems. Once on such a system, it 
checked for the presence of Siemens Step 7 software, the Windows software 
that managed the ICS for the centrifuges. If it found that software, Stuxnet 
then compromised the PLCs, accelerating the centrifuges to such a high 
speed that they broke apart, all the time showing “normal operation” on the 
HMI displays. One of the many lessons of Stuxnet is that it is impossible to 
control a malware weapon in the wild; while Iran was the target, only about 
59 percent of the victim systems were located in Iran.279 Stuxnet was followed 
by more weaponized malware with names such as Duqu, Flame, and Gauss. 
Inevitably, there are families of malware that specifically target ICS, such 
as CrashOverride and Trisis/Triton, both of which appear to target power 
grids and utility systems.280
ICS provide an opportunity to build systems that can respond to abnor-
mal events faster and more efficiently than a human. But these systems need 
to be understood by the humans who manage them and, indeed, must pro-
vide a way for the human to override the automatic controls should they be 
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compromised. Although not a cyber issue, per se, issues with the Boeing 
737 MAX 8 provide an object lesson. The 737 MAX is equipped with an 
automatic trim system called the Maneuvering Characteristics Automation 
System (MCAS). A larger engine on the 737 MAX caused the plane’s stability 
characteristics to be different than on previous versions of the 737 and, in 
fact, harder for the pilots to fully manage. MCAS was meant to better control 
the handling of the aircraft by monitoring an angle of attack (AOA) sensor. 
However, in two crashes of the 737 MAX, the system overcorrected, and 
the pilots could not override the system. In the crash of Ethiopian Airlines 
Flight 302, the AOA sensors provided erroneous readings causing the plane 
to deviate from a smooth take off. Pilots attempted to regain control, but 
the MCAS would then take over again; it appears that the pilots and MCAS 
exchanged control of the plane several times during its six-minute flight.281
As noted above, there are billions of IoT devices globally on the internet 
and many are not well secured. These devices are an attractive target for an 
attacker because they represent incredible computing power as a distributed 
network or botnet. The botnet, in turn, can be used as a platform with which 
to launch DDoS attacks with incredible bandwidth against their victims. 
Due to a desire to keep prices down, IoT devices are largely designed to 
depend upon the border security of the network on which they are installed, 
leaving the devices themselves prone to weaknesses ranging from insecure 
web, mobile, or cloud accessible interfaces, inadequate tools with which to 
configure security parameters, and insecure software or firmware to weak 
authentication/authorization mechanisms, insecure network services, and a 
lack of encryption. The IoT networks themselves have many points of inse-
curity, including the sensors, communications network, and the back-end 
IT systems. While these are generic IoT security concerns, each specific 
application and architecture introduces its own security issues.282
The threat of IoT device exploitation is so real that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) released a public warning about potential exploitation 
as far back as 2017.283 And the FBI’s warnings were well warranted. There are 
sites on the internet that allow people to search the internet for IoT devices,284 
and other sites where people can find known or leaked passwords for IoT 
devices.285
Due to these weaknesses and vulnerabilities, IoT devices have been com-
promised and used as part of several large DDoS attacks. One of the best 
known was the 21 October 2016 attack against Dyn, a company providing 
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internet performance management, name registration, and DNS services. The 
Dyn attackers used malware called Mirai, which targeted Linux systems—a 
common operating system on IoT processors—and primarily focused on 
consumer IoT equipment, such as remote cameras and home routers. The 
Dyn DDoS employed a botnet of tens of thousands of compromised IoT 
devices, sending an estimated load of up to 1.2 Tbps. Dyn hosts websites for 
more than 70 major media, news, commercial, financial, communication, 
and other organizations; all were inaccessible for most of a day while Dyn 
suffered from three waves of DDoS. While Anonymous and New World 
Hackers claimed responsibility for the attack as retaliation for the Ecuador-
ian embassy in London rescinding Julian Assange’s286 internet access, others 
have claimed the attack was perpetrated by script kiddies or an angry gamer. 
The real bottom line is that the attack was not technically complicated and 
well within the means of almost any hacker.287 IoT botnets using the Mirai 
malware were also used to perpetrate DDoS attacks a month earlier against 
the KrebsOnSecurity blog (600 gigabits per second) and OVH, France’s larg-
est web host (1.1 Tbps).288
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Appendix 6. Autonomous Vessel Background
Drivers for Autonomous Vessels
The maritime industry has been engaging in research and planning for the 
likely adoption of autonomous vessels for many years. OT and IoT technolo-
gies have caught up to the demand so that such vessels are becoming a real-
ity. Given this, autonomous can mean different things to different people; 
it is used to refer to highly automated vessels with skeleton crews, remote-
controlled vessels, fully autonomous/unmanned vessels, and hybrids that are 
some combination of all of these.289 While most of the work on autonomous 
vessels is driven by economic imperatives, practical requirements are also 
at play. As an example, due to the travel restrictions brought on by the 2019 
Coronavirus disease, Royal Caribbean’s Silversea Cruises conducted remote 
control testing during the April 2020 sea trial of a new vessel, Silver Origin. 
The captain, on board, acted as lookout while the maneuvering systems 
were controlled and calibrated by an operator 1,120 miles (1,800 kilometers) 
away.290
For purposes of the discussion in the remainder of this appendix, auton-
omy will refer to fully autonomous or hybrid remote-control/partially auton-
omous vessels that do not have a crew on board.291
There are myriad factors that make autonomous vessels attractive to the 
industry. One of the biggest is safety; the majority of maritime accidents 
are caused by human error and a large number of those errors are due to 
fatigue.292 Autonomous vessels with automated controls and responses, pos-
sibly including a remote operator, will presumably be able to remain alert on 
a 24/7 basis and respond more quickly than humans to unexpected events.293 
Vessels can be designed that will carry more cargo than today’s cargo vessels 
because they will not need space for people-oriented structures such as decks, 
a bridge, and crew quarters, nor will they need environmental systems that 
would support a crew. As a result, these ships can be designed to be more 
wind resistant and streamlined in the water (figure 21), resulting in a lighter, 
more efficient vessel that will be cheaper to operate and use less fuel.294
Autonomous vessels also offer a response to the problem of finding and 
attracting trained merchant mariners for the growing commercial fleets. As 
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ships become more and more dependent on computers and other automation, 
shipping lines are finding it increasingly difficult to find merchant mariners 
with the necessary maritime and technical skills to operate a modern vessel. 
At the same time, fewer people from developed nations are looking to the 
merchant marine as an attractive career, given the long times at sea away 
from friends and family. Indeed, unmanned vessels might also be less prone 
to the dangers of piracy due to the fact that there are no hostages to take.295
Without a human on board, a ship’s automated controls and/or remote 
operator will be dependent upon numerous technologies. Situational aware-
ness and PNT functions will still require GNSS fixes, weather reports, AIS, 
and other communications from other vessels and shore stations. High-
definition visible-light and infrared cameras, radar, and lidar will supple-
ment these systems by providing a broad picture of the local environment. 
These systems become critical when operating in the LZ due to the relative 
congestion of shipping, localized hazards, and rapid rate of a changing con-
ditions in these waters.296 Autonomous vessels operating inland, near-shore, 
or near congested shipping lanes require far more diligence and attention on 
the part of the ship’s master or operator yet the technology systems on which 
they must depend have many cybersecurity vulnerabilities, as discussed in 
previous chapters.
While advantageous for many reasons, autonomous vessels will also 
require operational changes, particularly when an autonomous vessel is 
Figure 21. Rendering of an autonomous cargo vessel at sea. 
Source: Kongsberg Maritime/used with permission
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around other ships—which will have a heightened impact on operations in 
the LZ. The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers is designed for mariners at sea and neither 
for autonomous vessels nor mariners operating from a shore station.297 In 
addition, maritime rules of the road are designed for manned vessels; how, 
for example, should an autonomous vessel meet the lookout requirement in 
Rule 5 of the 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Prevent-
ing Collisions at Sea?298
Autonomous vessel-related research is one of the most active areas within 
the maritime sector.299 It is likely that full autonomy will start with services 
in the inshore or near-shore LZ, such as short haul ferries, autonomous tug-
boats, and autonomous offshore mooring systems. Autonomous military ves-
sels are already being considered for some routine operations and integration 
into battle groups. Autonomous drones will undoubtedly be integrated into 
near-shore and inland vessel and port operations, along with autonomous 
vehicles at the ports themselves.300 All of this raises the specter of another 
USS Cole-like attack occurring in a foreign port with swarms of automated 
vessels, drones, or other vehicles.301
Autonomous Vessels in the MTS
The 2010–2020 timeframe saw many research and development initiatives 
around MASS, including:
• The European Commission’s Maritime Unmanned Navigation 
through Intelligence in Networks project ran from 2012–2015 and 
addressed operational, technical, and legal aspects of autonomous 
shipping.302
• Rolls-Royce has been an industry leader in MASS research, leading the 
Advanced Autonomous Waterborne Applications (AAWA) Initiative 
from 2015 to 2017, with plans for rollout of a small vessel in the early 
2020s. The follow-on project, called Safer Vessel with Autonomous 
Navigation (SVAN), focuses on implementing the lessons learned from 
the AAWA project.303
• Mitsui O.S.K. Lines and Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding were 
selected, in 2017, by the Japanese government to lead the development 
of an autonomous ocean transport system.304
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• The Novel Inland Water Transport and Maritime Transport Concepts 
project is promoting the vessel train concept, where a fully crewed 
vessel leads a group of semi-autonomous vessels, all of which are in 
communication with the lead ship. Funded by the European Commis-
sion in 2017, the research involves 22 companies from nine countries.305
• In 2018, Norwegian shipping companies Kongsberg and Wilhelmsen 
established a joint venture called Massterly, with plans to offer the 
complete suite of autonomous vessel services including design, devel-
opment, control systems, logistics, and operations.306
• In 2019, the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore launched their 
Maritime Innovation Lab to start research and development of sev-
eral autonomous maritime programs—including vessels, navigation 
systems, and situational awareness systems.307
The era is upon us when research leads to the nascent stages of autono-
mous vessel implementation. In December 2018, Rolls-Royce308 and Finferries 
demonstrated the first fully autonomous transit and docking of a vessel with 
Falco, a 177-foot (53.8 meter) car ferry in Finland (figure 22). Using results 
of the SVAN project, Falco operated in a fully autonomous mode on the one 
mile (1664 meter) outbound trip and under remote control on the return; 
a captain monitored the vessel from an autonomous operations center 30 
miles (50 kilometers) away.309
Figure 22. Demonstration of the first fully autonomous transit and docking of a 
vessel, using the car ferry Falco. Source: Finferries/used with permission
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In February 2020, Bastø Fosen, Kongsberg, and the Norwegian Maritime 
Authority started a six-month trial running Bastø Fosen VI, a 469-foot (142.9 
meter) semi-autonomous passenger and vehicle ferry, on an approximately 
seven mile (11 kilometer), 30 minute route. Dubbed the world’s first adaptive 
ferry transit, the vessel operates under fully automated control from dock 
to dock, with a captain and full crew on board for oversight.310 In another 
project, Kongsberg and Yara plan to have Yara Birkeland—a 260-foot (80 
meter) electric, autonomous container ship—operational by 2022. This vessel 
will transport cargo on an approximately 15 mile (24 kilometer) inland route 
in Norway.311
September 2020 was the 400th anniversary of the Pilgrims depart-
ing England on the sailing vessel Mayflower. The fully autonomous vessel 
Mayflower is scheduled to start the 3,220-mile (5,182 kilometer) trip from 
Plymouth, England to Plymouth, Massachusetts in May 2021 (figure 23). 
The Mayflower Autonomous Ship (MAS) project is a global consortium that 
includes IBM, ProMare, the University of Birmingham UK, and the Univer-
sity of Plymouth UK. Mayflower will rely on solar, diesel, and wind power, 
and will employ AI, deep learning, and standard maritime technologies to 
manage the crossing. This will represent the first trial of a full-sized, open 
ocean autonomous vessel.312
Figure 23. Rendering of the autonomous vessel Mayflower. Source: IBM/ProMare/
used with permission
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Large autonomous cargo vessels as envisioned by the industry will neces-
sarily change the way in which those ships interact with tugs. As might be 
expected, research into the use and deployment of fully autonomous and/
or remote-controlled tugboats is an area of extensive research. Appropriate 
autonomy technology might vary whether the tug will operate in ports and 
port approaches (harbor tug); at offshore terminals (terminal tug); as an 
escort for tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers, or large container vessels at 
a relatively high speed in port approaches (escort tug); or as an emergency 
towing vessel. Autonomous operation of tugs is challenging for many rea-
sons, not the least of which is the way in which two ships affect each other 
when in proximity at sea. Given the fact that the tug will be the smaller of 
the two vessels, it is the tug that has the higher risk. Indeed, proper use of AI 
and ML is as high a priority with tugs as is autonomous controls and naviga-
tion. Maneuvering the tug—or a set of tugs—is only the first step; now the 
tug needs to connect to the larger vessel. Autonomous tugboat-ship coupling 
systems is another area that needs to be developed.313 Tests of autonomous 
and remote operated tugs have been underway since 2017 in the North Sea, 
Port of Copenhagen, Port of Singapore, and other areas around the globe; 
although most have been under relatively optimal conditions, tests in adverse 
weather and seas has not yet been performed.314
Another area of research in this sector is autonomous mooring systems, 
both in port and at offshore facilities. Autonomous mooring systems can be 
used with any type of vessel but have some obvious advantages for autono-
mous ships; as an example, one such system is being designed specifically for 
the Yara Birkeland to provide autonomous mooring as well as autonomous 
cargo loading and unloading.315
Although developed independently, autonomous unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs)—or drones—have become a part of autonomous maritime 
systems. Both autonomous and remote-control UAVs have been proposed 
as aerial surveillance systems to provide additional collision avoidance infor-
mation and a larger situation awareness perimeter to manned and autono-
mous ships.316 Autonomous drones have also been proposed to supplement 
humans in ship inspections. Drones can safely enter locations on vessels that 
might be too dangerous for people—doing everything from transmitting a 
video feed for real-time analysis by an inspector or specialized software, to 
using high-spectral imaging for detailed analysis beyond the capabilities 
of a human.317 Autonomous tugboats and mooring systems might also be 
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supplemented by autonomous UAVs for functions such as transporting heav-
ing lines from the dock or tug to a ship.318 All of these functions are likely to 
occur in near coastal or inland waters, meaning that mariners are likely to 
see more drones in the air, with no real a priori knowledge of their purpose 
or intentions. While remote-controlled and autonomous UAVs have some 
unique cybersecurity vulnerabilities, they are generically similar to those in 
the maritime space.319 Further discussion of cybersecurity issues of UAVs is 
beyond the scope of this monograph.
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Appendix 7. Approaches to Qualitative 
Risk Assessment
There are two primary methods in which to perform cyber risk assessment: 
quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative methods are objective and mea-
surable, while a qualitative approach is more subjective and less tangible. 
Quantitative methods require the ability to assign value to assets at risk, 
which can include the cost of replacement, downtime, repair, negative pub-
licity, etc. These methods also require the ability to predict the frequency 
with which assets will suffer loss. This allows the owner to do a cost-benefit 
analysis of the actual cost of cyber defense mechanisms versus the antici-
pated cost of asset loss. The major drawback of this method is that it takes 
a long time to do this analysis well, even though it is extremely difficult to 
truly know the costs.320
Qualitative methods are scenario-based and work by describing the 
events that can go wrong. The assessor can then assign a “grade” based 
upon the perceived likelihood of an event occurring and the impact to the 
system or organization should the event occur. This type of planning helps 
an organization identify strengths and vulnerabilities to create contingency 
plans and recovery systems. In the most common usage, the probability of 
occurrence is a five-point scale ranging from rare to certainty; severity is 
a four-point scale ranging from negligible impact to catastrophic (figure 
24). Scenarios considered to be unlikely or that would rarely occur with a 
negligible or moderate impact fall into the low level of risk category, which 
is numbered four. Scenarios classified with higher likelihoods and/or higher 
levels of severity are placed into different risk categories with extremely high 
level of risk being the highest, which is numbered one. It is impossible to 
eliminate risk, but this qualitative tool assists cyber defenders in identifying 
the areas of most vulnerability and in prioritizing allocation of cyber defense 
resources to mitigate risk where possible.321
Chapter 5 introduced Tam and Jones’ multi-axis model for autonomous 
vessel risk assessment.322 It is a model that focuses on offensive strategy rather 
than defensive and could be applied to other aspects of maritime, or even 
more general, cybersecurity. Tam and Jones describe three axes, namely 
technology (i.e., level of autonomy), attacker reward, and ease of exploit. 
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Figure 25 shows two of these axes in a two-dimensional chart. Once appro-
priate scenarios are devised and assigned a tier level (1-5), the scenario can 
be classified based upon its placement on the effort-reward chart. Scenarios 
in the high reward/low effort quadrant (upper right) are most likely the first 
where cyber defense resources should be directed whereas the low reward/
high effort quadrant (lower left) are not areas of greatest vulnerability.
The simplicity of the two-dimensional risk models belies the complexity 
of the actual cybersecurity threats. Figure 26 shows all three axes of the Tam 
and Jones model in a three-dimension chart. In this particular case, the dif-
ferent technologies do not necessarily add to the difficulty of an attack, nor 
the potential reward for the attacker. Thus, it is the entire high reward/low 
effort plane that becomes the priority for cyber defense.
Figure 24. Risk assessment matrix. Source: USCG 
Auxiliary, National Response Directorate
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Figure 25. Two-dimension effort-reward chart. Source: Gary C. Kessler 
Figure 26. Three-dimension effort-reward-technology chart. 
Source: Gary C. Kessler
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Acronyms
AAWA  Advanced Autonomous Waterborne Applications
AI  artificial intelligence
AIS  Automatic Identification System
AOA  angle of attack
APT  advanced persistent threat
ATON  aid to navigation
C4ADS  Center for Advanced Defense Studies
C/A  coarse/acquisition code
CAN  Controller Area Network
CDMA  code-division multiple access
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
COSCO China Ocean Shipping Company
COTS  commercial off-the-shelf
CPA  closest point of approach
CPS  cyber-physical systems
DCS  distributed control system
DHS  Department of Homeland Security
DDoS  distributed denial-of-service
DIB  defense industrial base
DNS  Domain Name System
DOD  U.S. Department of Defense
DoS  denial-of-service
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ECDIS  electronic chart display and information system
EO  executive order
EU  European Union
EW  electronic warfare
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Russia)
GNSS  Global Navigation Satellite System 
GPS  Global Positioning System
HMI  human-machine interface
ICS  industrial control systems
ICT  information and communications technology
IMU  inertial measurement units
IoT  Internet of Things
IP  internet protocol
ISS  International Space Station
IT  information technology
ITU  International Telecommunication Union
ITU-R  International Telecommunication Union,  
  Radiocommunication Sector
IW  irregular warfare
LCS  littoral combat ships
LZ  littoral zone
MASS  maritime autonomous surface ships
MCAS  Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System
MEO  medium earth orbit
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MHz  megahertz
ML  machine learning
MMSI  Maritime Mobile Service Identity
MSA  Maritime Safety Administration
MTS  Maritime Transportation System
NMEA  National Maritime Electronics Association
NSA  National Security Agency
OT  operational technology
P(Y)  precision code (encrypted)
PLA  People’s Liberation Army
PLC  programmable logic controller
PNT  positioning, navigation, and timing
PPS  Precise Positioning Service
PRN  pseudorandom noise
RAT  remote access Trojan
RTU  remote terminal unit
SA  selective availability
SAR  search and rescue
SATCOM satellite communications
SCADA  supervisory control and data acquisition
SDR  software-defined radio
SOF  Special Operations Forces
SOLAS  Safety of Life at Sea Convention
SPS  Standard Positioning Service
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SVAN  Safer Vessel with Autonomous Navigation
Tbps  terabits per second
TTP  tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAV  unmanned aerial vehicle
UHF  ultra high frequency
UK  United Kingdom
USB  Universal Serial Bus
USCG  United States Coast Guard
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
USV  unmanned surface vessel
UT  The University of Texas at Austin
UTC  Coordinated Universal Time
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